Open Discussions/ Gulf Cultural Club
Yemen: a new dawn or further bloodshed
** Dr Abdul Galil Shaif (Yemeni community leader)
*** Helen Lackner (author, Yemen expert)
At the beginning of December the Southern Transitional Council seized most of South Yemen upending a relatively calm status quo that prevailed since a UN brokered truce paused major fighting in the war which began in 2014. The country could now be split in two and an independent South Yemeni state may be recreated. The STC’s takeover could rekindle a devastating
civil war as Saudi Arabia bombed STC positions in South Yemen and the STC lost all the territory it had captured. The internationally-recognized government has called for a dialogue in Riyadh while the STC has announced a constitution and plans to hold a referendum on independence from the north. Our speakers will discuss what the future holds for Yemen as Saudi Arabia backs the internationally recognized government and the UAE backs the STC.
Tuesday 13 January 2026
Dr Abdul Gaili Shaif: In early January 2026, South Yemen came closer to independence than at any moment since unification in 1990. This was not simply another episode in Yemen’s long war, nor was it a symbolic political gesture. It was a convergence of military control, political declaration, and the near-collapse of effective state authority across much of the south.
For a brief moment, independence appeared not just imaginable, but procedurally achievable. Yet that moment was halted — not primarily by Yemeni actors themselves, but by regional intervention, particularly by Saudi Arabia, and by deep concern from Oman.
The importance of late 2025 and early 2026 lies in the nature of what unfolded. South Yemen has for decades a long had a powerful independence movement, but it has often lacked one of three critical elements: sustained territorial control, political coherence, or international plausibility.
In this critical moment, all three briefly aligned.The Southern Transitional Council, or STC, exercised some military power on the ground. The internationally recognised Yemeni government had largely ceased to function as an effective authority in the liberated areas. The STC made this military move presumably with some international support that didn’t materialise when required.
This alignment transformed the southern issue from a historical grievance into an urgent regional strategic concern for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
On the first of January 2026, the STC issued a landmark constitutional declaration. Rather than announcing immediate independence, it outlined a two-year transitional period culminating in a referendum on southern self-determination.
This distinction is crucial. The STC was not declaring a state; it was declaring a process. And processes — especially those anchored in constitutional language and referenda are far more difficult for regional and international actors to dismiss.
The declaration framed southern independence as a response to decades of marginalisation since 1990 and as the inevitable outcome of repeated failures to address the southern question in peace processes. It was carefully crafted not only for a domestic audience, but also for regional and international actors, signalling political maturity and readiness for governance.
The declaration did not emerge in a vacuum. In the weeks preceding it, STC-aligned forces launched a swift and coordinated military campaign across Hadramaut and al-Mahra — two vast eastern governorates that had largely avoided heavy fighting throughout Yemen’s war. The military campaign was militarily viewed as an outstanding success for the STC and its forces.
The campaign was notable for its speed and restraint. STC forces moved through desert terrain, tribal routes, and lightly defended towns, encountering minimal resistance. There was little large-scale destruction, suggesting a campaign designed to appear stabilising rather than disruptive.
This was not a symbolic advance. Hadramaut is Yemen’s largest governorate and a major oil-producing region. Al-Mahra offers strategic coastline access and borders Oman. Together, they would have provided the territorial and economic backbone of a future southern state.
Internationally, the STC framed the campaign as part of a counter-terrorism effort, targeting Muslim Brotherhood-aligned factions and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Given long-standing international concern about extremist groups in eastern Yemen, this narrative initially gained some acceptance with some evidence to substantiate this claim.
But beneath the security framing lay a deeper political logic: territorial control creates facts, and facts create leverage. What happens next was not calculated by the STC or rather they took a risk on the basis that the Saudis will not intervene militarily against one of its important partners in the war against the Houthis in North Yemen.
While Saudi Arabia’s reaction ultimately proved decisive, Oman was deeply unsettled by the STC’s move into al-Mahra. The governorate borders directly on Omani territory and has long been viewed by Muscat as a sensitive buffer zone.
Oman’s Yemen policy has consistently prioritised neutrality, mediation, and border stability. From Muscat’s perspective, the problem was not southern self-determination itself, but the sudden expansion of armed actors near its border regardless of ideology or alignment. The Omani government expressed its concern on this matter to the international community.
Saudi Arabia’s response was swift and decisive. While Riyadh had previously tolerated and at times cooperated with the STC, it concluded that a full STC victory posed an unacceptable strategic risk.
A successful STC-led referendum would have effectively ended the authority of the internationally recognised Yemeni government that Saudi Arabia supports. More importantly, it would have locked in a loss of Saudi influence in southern Yemen that could not easily be reversed. The Saudis simply could not allow the STC to take control of what it sees as its critical border line with South Yemen.
Saudi-backed government forces, supported by coalition air power, moved to roll back STC gains, retaking key centres such as Mukalla. The message was unmistakable: unilateral southern independence would not be allowed to proceed. Airstrikes against the STC forces in Hadramaut were effective in driving back STC forces and destroying their heavy weapons.
This episode also exposed growing tension between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the STC’s principal external backer, highlighting divergent Gulf visions for Yemen’s future. The emirates pulled out of the coalition and its support for counter terrorism in Yemen. The STC forces were quickly replaced national defence forces and the giant brigade. In order to defuse the situation, the Saudis called for a south, South conference under its umbrella in Riyadh. The STC has welcomed this move and sent a high level delegation. Aidrouse Alzubaidi did not accompany the delegation, and his whereabouts remain unclear.
Yet Saudi Arabia’s challenge does not end with military containment. Riyadh now faces a twofold headache.
First, the depth of popular southern support for independence has become impossible to ignore. On 10 January 2025, despite the military defeat of STC forces , Aden witnessed one of the largest protests in its modern history. Hundreds of thousands took to the streets, unequivocally reiterating the southern demand for independence and expressing strong popular support for STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi.
This was not merely a symbolic demonstration. It underscored a critical reality for Saudi decision-makers: the southern issue is not an elite-driven project. It is rooted in mass mobilisation and popular sentiment that cannot simply be managed through force or elite negotiations.
Second, and perhaps more destabilising, is the continued uncertainty surrounding the whereabouts of Aidarous al-Zubaidi himself. His absence, combined with reports of Saudi airstrikes hitting symbolic locations, including his hometown, has fuelled speculation about whether he will re-emerge — politically or otherwise — and what form that comeback might take.
For Riyadh, al-Zubaidi represents both a problem and a necessity: a figure who embodies southern aspirations, yet one whose influence remains difficult to control
Against this backdrop, Saudi Arabia has moved to shift the struggle from the battlefield to the negotiating table. Riyadh has announced plans to host a “Southern Conference” in the coming weeks, bringing together southern political forces to address grievances and future governance arrangements.
The STC has agreed to participate, signalling a willingness to engage despite recent confrontations. For the STC, the conference offers an opportunity to regain political momentum, restore regional legitimacy, and keep the question of self-determination alive through political channels.
For Saudi Arabia, the conference is an attempt to contain separatist momentum, manage popular expectations, and reassert its role as the central broker in Yemen’s future.
Whether the conference produces meaningful outcomes or merely symbolic gestures remains an open question.
We are entering a decisive but deeply uncertain phase. For Saudi Arabia, the southern question is no longer a manageable file — it is a strategic dilemma. On the one hand, Riyadh has demonstrated that it can block unilateral independence through force. On the other, it has become increasingly clear that it cannot suppress a popular southern movement without incurring long-term political costs.
The mass mobilisation in Aden, the persistence of the independence narrative, and the symbolic weight of Aidarous al-Zubaidi all point to the same reality: southern aspirations cannot be bombed out of existence, nor negotiated away behind closed doors. They must be confronted politically.
The upcoming conference in Riyadh may offer southerners genuine recognition and a credible political pathway forward — or it may reinforce the perception that dialogue is being used to defer, rather than resolve, the question of self-determination. If it fails to address the depth of popular sentiment in the south, it risks becoming not a solution, but another missed opportunity.
What we are witnessing, then, is not the end of South Yemen’s independence project, but a test of how — and by whom — it will be shaped. The battlefield has paused, but the struggle has not ended. It has merely changed arenas.
And the central question remains unresolved: will South Yemen’s future be decided in conference halls by regional powers, or ultimately in the streets by a population that has already made its aspirations unmistakably clear?
Helen Lackner: Whether you think the Houthis are happy or unhappy about what is happening depends on what you think the outcome of what is happening will be. There is a view that the outcome is going to be somewhat chaotic and problematic and that there will be periods of continuing chaos.
What was initially a muted confrontation has now become and open conflict between the Saudis and the Emirates. If you think this is now settled and in favour of the internationally recognised government and the role of the Emirates will become minimal I think the situation is bad news for the Houthis because having to face an actual organized, competent IRG is the by far the last thing they want.
Of on the other hand you want to think there will be continued instability and problems and the axis of the STC which are against the agreements which are being made at the moment by the Saudis and the IRG are going to fail and there is going to be another conflict in the southern part of Yemen then it is very good news for the Houthis. So really whether this is bad or good news for the Houthis depends on what you think the outcome of the current conflict is going to be.
What I am giving is a number of disconnected points and what I am actually trying to point out at this stage is – I have done a podcast of half an hour for the Arab digest which gives a more coherent interpretation of my views then what I am doing now.
I would like to come back to the feelings of people in the southern part of Yemen in the former PDRY about unity and the STC. The feelings about unity vary. There are a number of different people who have different views and a number of people fully supported unity.
It is worth remembering – I was actually living there in the late 80s and going back and forth between the two part of Yemen at the time. In the late 70s and 80s the enthusiasm for Yemeni unity was quite universal. When it happened it was greeted with great enthusiasm by the vast majority of the people and the fact that it was not well managed and the 1994 civil war took place was a major contributor to alienating many people in the south from Yemeni unity.
But the moving on to the situation in Hadramout Hadramout was not part of the state that the British were trying to create in the 60s and it was not very often part of a wider Yemen. And if you at the culture and thinking of Hadramout it really is different from that in the rest of Yemen. The people in Hadramout have a much closer relationship to the people in Saudi Arabia. There are much more facilities for migrating to Saudi and of course many famous names from Yemen are in Saudi cities. This is an important element.
It is also important to remember that the people of Hadramout really do not like the people from the core area of the STC. Although there were certainly people who were not from the core area of Dalah and Lahej in the STC troops I was really stunned when I saw the figures of the number of people killed in the fighting. They were almost all from Dlaha and Yafah and Hussainiya and all those areas which is really the core area of the STC. So that is an important element to remember: the Hadramis really do not feel associated with other parts of Yemen.
My understanding is that the Hadramis would like to have automony at least and independence at best and they want to have a relationship with the capital whether it is in Sanaa or in Aden and fairly arms length relationship. This is what has to be remembered about Hadramout and it depends on which news you saw they were definitely not welcoming the STC when they took over.
One other element which has not been brought out about the current situation is that there is a group from the STC who have declared its dissolution and this is denied by another group of the STC. And if you look at what is happening on the ground is that the three main southern leaders of the STC Zubaidi, Muahmani and Basani. Basani has been basically out it. He has made a few pro STC statements in the last couple of days but I understand he has had medical problems and he has basically not been involved until recently.
But if you look at Zubaidi and Mahrami, Mahrami is now the head of the security for the IRG. In other words his group are now representing the Al Alami government. So it is very clear if you look back at what has been going on over the last year there are internal splits within the southern separatists between those from Dhala and those from Yafia is a very relevant element because Muharami is from Yafia.
So these are elements that are really important to be looked at when you are examining the situation at the moment in Yemen and what might happen. And it is very clear to me that things have pretty much calmed down and hopefully we are going to see something come out of this conference that is being hosted by the Saudis and which is hopefully being organized by Al Alami and his colleagues.
Hopefully this will come to a useful solution because it is clear and everybody has recognized that the southern issue is an issue that needs to be dealt with. And if we go back to the period of the national dialogue and even before there were two major movements who were causing problems to the central government: one was the Houthis and the other one was the southern question.
So both of these need addressing and ideally both of them need addressing in a constructive manner by the central government has power. And to me the most positive outcome at the moment is that there will be a central internationally recognized government which includes people from all over the country and which is capable of addressing the problems of Yemen including the one of the south and the centre.
There were a few things that came out of the national dialogue – the actual proposal of the regions of having the two basic features in the south. This is one that makes a lot of sense. Hadramout is very much in favour of autonomy and if you look at my writings over the past ten years or longer I have said that Hadramout does not want to be ruled by people from the far west or what was then the PDRY. They are culturally and historically different.
*Dr Abdul Galil Shaif immigrated to Britain from Yemen at the age of nine. He graduated from Sheffield Hallam University and earned a Master of Arts in Economics and a PhD in Political Science from Sheffield University. He is currently a chief executive ACT Aspiring Communities Together (ACT) and CEO of Hadfield Institute which promotes educational
and training opportunities in the City of Sheffield and elsewhere for disadvantaged and unemployed people.
****Helen Lacker is author of ‘Yemen in Crisis, Devastating Conflict, Fragile Hope’ (Saqi 2023), Yemen: Poverty and Conflict’ (Routledge, 2023) ”Why Yemen Matters’ (Saqi 2014) ‘PDR Yemen: Outpost of Socialist Development in Arabia’ (1985) Ithaca Press, London and A House Built on Sand, a political economy of Saudi Arabia’ (1978) Ithaca Press, London.
