Tribes played a key role in military operations against the SDF, and their loyalty could prove vital to the future of statebuilding in Syria.
Deir Az-Zour, Syria – In eastern Syria, long the country’s tribal heartland, the past few weeks have been marked by family reunions and tribal gatherings.
After the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) were pushed out of the Arab-majority provinces of Deir Az-Zour and most of Raqqa – mainly by locals and tribesmen, according to local sources – tribal leaders have been returning and taking photos of themselves in places they hadn’t been for years, sometimes decades.
“Arab tribal fighters and clan networks were not just ‘background actors’, they were part of the operational logic,” Haian Dukhan, a leading expert on tribes, told The New Arab, regarding the Syrian army’s offensive this month.
“Multiple reports describe government forces advancing alongside allied Arab tribal fighters, with tribal defections and local Arab armed groups helping the government move quickly, including around oil and gas infrastructure in Deir Az-Zour.”
On a visit to the al-Omar oil field on 19 January, Syria’s largest and long under SDF control in eastern Deir Az-Zour, The New Arab was accompanied by a member of the Ougaidat tribal confederation, the largest in this part of Syria. He had bought a ticket from Saudi Arabia to Damascus as soon as he got a call saying his home province was being freed from the SDF.
“It looks less like one unified tribal command and more like selective pre-alignment and rapid bandwagoning once the SDF pullback began,” Dukhan said, in terms of coordination of the offensive.
“Reporting from the ground stresses the ‘overnight’ nature of SDF withdrawals in parts of Deir Az-Zour and Raqqa, and also notes that tribes and local armed actors pushed back against SDF units during the handover dynamic, which suggests opportunistic coordination at the locality and sub-tribe level rather than a single, comprehensive tribal ‘operations room,’” he added.
The New Arab was told by other sources from Deir Az-Zour, however, that there had in fact been an operations room based in the regional capital of Deir Az-Zour on the western banks of the Euphrates River, which had been liberated by the forces under President Ahmed Al-Sharaa in December 2024.
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TNA’s requests to meet with some of those involved in the ‘operations room’ were declined.
The city of Deir Az-Zour was handed over by forces under and aligned with former dictator Bashar Al-Assad to the SDF when the former pulled out in December 2024. After local opposition to it, however, the SDF was also forced to leave only days later.
In September, Sheikh Jihad Issa Sheikh – a long-time close associate of, though at times also at odds with, Al-Sharaa – was appointed adviser to the president for tribal and clan affairs.
“Adherence to the leadership’s directives is not blind obedience, but a commitment to a path that preserves the nation’s dignity and prevents its descent into chaos once again,” the advisor, better known as Abu Ahmed Zakour, wrote in a social media post on 17 January, just as the operation was beginning.
“Discipline today is the gateway to freedom tomorrow. Respect for the law today is the guarantee of justice tomorrow. And joint action today is the future of our children tomorrow,” the post added.
Zakour had, in the preceding months, conducted a flurry of meetings with tribal figures in different parts of the country, with Dukhan noting that he had helped Damascus “prepare the ground” politically ahead of the Raqqa and Deir Az-Zour shift.
“The practical value is that his role appears to have been relationship management and brokerage, meaning signalling to Arab tribal leaders that the new centre would treat them as partners, accelerating defections and lowering the political cost of switching sides,” Dukhan added.
The tribal expert said that there is also an institutional layer, as the new authorities have created a dedicated Office of Tribes and Clans to manage tensions and integrate tribal constituencies.
“Zakour’s appointment fits that broader attempt to convert tribal power into governable channels rather than leaving it as autonomous armed influence,” Dukhan told TNA.
“The pattern described in multiple accounts is: SDF withdrawals, followed by local armed actors stepping in, then state forces consolidating. In practice, tribes and local Arab factions can offer ‘interim security’ in three ways: (a) manning checkpoints and controlling movement, (b) protecting key sites (bridges, oil facilities, government buildings), and (c) providing local intelligence on rivals and on ISIS cells,” he added.
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Concerns have been expressed about weapons remaining in the hands of the tribes, though some say this is an issue that will be dealt with further down the road.
“Formally, you can frame it as: the issue is less ‘tribes are allowed’ in law, and more that tribes often hold weapons de facto because the state (and previously the SDF) has repeatedly relied on armed local intermediaries to govern and fight,” Dukhan said.
Under the SDF, Arab-majority areas were managed through local councils and military councils, and local recruitment tracked social and tribal realities.
In the current transitional setting, however, Damascus is trying to rebuild state security institutions and integrate forces, but the security environment still features fragmented armed actors and “uncontrolled weapons” as a problem in parts of the country.
“So, tribes may retain privileged armed capacity because they are treated as auxiliaries or partners during integration, especially where the state needs manpower, local legitimacy, and intelligence,” Dukhan noted.
Some have criticised the fact that tribal leaders known to have been close to the former Assad regime or Iran have not faced any consequences for their actions. The most well-known example is that of the Baggara tribe’s Sheikh Nawaf al-Bashir, who is also, incidentally, from the same tribe as that of Zakour.
“For Nawaf al-Bashir specifically, recent reporting says he publicly declared support for President Ahmed Al-Sharaa in early December 2025,” Dukhan noted to The New Arab, amid claims he had been briefly detained then released through mediation.
“That suggests the current logic is co-optation first, accountability later (if at all), because the new authorities want to secure tribal buy-in in the east during a fragile transition.”
Whether this dynamic will change or not depends on several factors. “A realistic way to phrase it is that it depends on whether the government prioritises (a) stability and incorporation over (b) transitional justice and deterrence,” Dukhan added.
There also remains a risk that local revenge dynamics could play out if figures seen as collaborators remain influential, with fears of reprisals if the state is not strong or present.
“That creates pressure for selective ‘accountability’ moves, but those moves may be highly political and uneven, targeting weaker figures while accommodating heavyweight brokers who can deliver calm, votes, or fighters,” Dukhan told TNA.
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“Under the SDF, tribes were influential but often channelled through SDF-designed governance structures (civil councils, military councils, internal security forces), with recurring complaints in Deir Az-Zour about representation, leadership selection, and the balance of power,” he added.
For now, as battles and negotiations continue for the mixed Arab and Kurdish province of Hasakah, tribes are set to play a major role in at least the immediate future of eastern Syria.
Shelly Kittleson is a journalist specialising in the Middle East and Afghanistan. Her work has been published in several international, US, and Italian media outlets.
