Iran’s Islamic Republic has endured, but persistent crackdowns, economic hardship, and growing public disillusionment make its long-term prospects unclear.
When mass protests erupted a month ago in Iran over economic grievances and quickly escalated into calls for regime change, the government responded with one of the bloodiest crackdowns in the Islamic Republic’s history.
US-based Human Rights Activists News Agency reported over 5,000 deaths, more than 7,000 injuries, and over 40,000 arrests amid widespread internet blackouts. Time Magazine, quoting two local health officials, said the death toll could even top 30,000.
Iranian authorities, in response, said that the US and Israel were fuelling the unrest, labelled protesters as terrorists, and reported that thousands had died.
These duelling narratives and the violent nature of the crackdown point to a deeper legitimacy crisis for the Islamic Republic, and one that is existential. Although the protests have been suppressed, the country’s underlying issues remain unresolved.
The political establishment now faces a defining dilemma: preserve an increasingly brittle status quo or open the door to structural reforms that could fundamentally reshape the Islamic Republic’s political order.
“The Iranian establishment in many ways is much weaker as a result of these protests, as well as the tremendous amount of violence that was used,” Trita Parsi, co-founder and executive vice president of the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, told The New Arab.
However, there haven’t been any signs of cracks within the leadership, he said. “We have not seen any major defections; in fact, we have seen them closing ranks.”
Over the past 25 years, Iran has weathered at least five major waves of mass protests, each met with violent crackdowns, showing a pattern that has become the Iranian political establishment’s default response to dissent.
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“The regime is primarily using repression and deterrence at home, combined with elite cohesion and narrative control, while relying on threats of external attacks to raise the cost of pressure without provoking full-scale conflict,” Sanam Vakil, director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, told TNA.
The immediate aftermath of these protests could see a period of heightened securitisation, followed by a gradual loosening of some social restrictions, as has occurred after previous unrest, Mehran Kamrava, professor of Government at Georgetown University in Qatar, told TNA.
Yet he explained that two major uncertainties could fundamentally alter the functioning of the Islamic Republic. “One is the death of 86-year-old Khamenei, and the other is the possibility of an American attack, because if the United States were to strike Iran, that would also seriously disrupt business as usual,” he said.
Deep economic, political, and social pressures make this wave of protests far harder for the regime than any before. Previous uprisings left Iran’s establishment intact, but this time the protests have blended economic grievances with civil rights demands, coupled with external pressure from the United States.
![Ayatollah Khamenei [Getty]](https://www.newarab.com/sites/default/files/styles/large_16_9/public/2256133050.jpeg?h=f64e1868&itok=P1y_e6u2)
Years of economic mismanagement, corruption, and renewed sanctions have crippled markets, sent inflation above 40%, and plunged the currency to record lows, making essentials unaffordable. Power outages and daily disruptions, meanwhile, have deepened public anger. While the government initially acknowledged the protests, it then took a violent, hardline approach as unrest spread and calls for regime change grew.
The country’s economic crisis deepened following Israel’s US-backed 12-day war in June last year, which further undermined the regime’s legitimacy. Iran’s nuclear sites were attacked, temporarily undermining its nuclear deterrence, while security officials, scientists, and over 1,000 civilians were killed.
On top of this, Iran’s ‘Axis of Resistance’ has been weakened. Hamas in Gaza and Hezbollah in Lebanon have been severely debilitated by their wars with Israel, and Bashar Al-Assad’s regime in Syria has fallen, leaving Tehran more vulnerable. The latest domestic unrest, therefore, hits a government that is weaker than ever before.
“I think there is a realisation within the political elite that the system is at a dead end and the status quo is not tenable,” Ali Vaez, Iran Project Director at International Crisis Group, told TNA.
“Those with vested interests will start thinking about how they can transform the system after [Iran’s Supreme Leader Ali] Khamenei is no longer on the scene, similar to China after Mao’s death and the 1989 Tiananmen crackdown, which saw economic liberalisation without political opening. The question is whether this status quo can hold in the meantime.”
While a sudden collapse of the political establishment is unlikely, experts warn that the Islamic Republic could be shaken by a convergence of pressures.
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Key risks may include splits within the security forces or between coercive institutions and provincial authorities, the sudden incapacitation or removal of the Supreme Leader, severe economic shocks such as currency collapse and strikes, and major external military strikes, according to Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London.
The latter “can either harden cohesion or accelerate behind-the-scenes bargaining over a new governing formula, depending on whether institutions believe survival requires adaptation,” he told TNA.
Iran’s latest protests have also drawn rare global focus, with US President Donald Trump threatening military action if Tehran continued killing civilians or executing protesters amid the brutal crackdown. But Turkey and Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Oman, have urged Washington to exercise restraint to avoid wider regional instability. Israel also reportedly advised against immediate action.
Trump has so far held off on attacking Iran, saying officials in Tehran had indicated that the killing of protesters had stopped and that they were willing to talk. Nevertheless, Washington recently moved US warships toward the Gulf as tensions simmered, with Iranian officials responding that an attack would be treated “as an all-out war”.
Caught between internal unrest and external pressures, Iran’s status quo is wavering. Yet without a unified opposition able to articulate an alternative, the next chapter for the Islamic Republic could unfold along multiple, unpredictable paths.
Vaez outlines several scenarios for the regime’s evolution: Soviet-style continuity with a weaker Supreme Leader, a Revolutionary Guards figurehead taking control, or a hard or soft military coup that adopts a pragmatic approach to Iran’s structural problems.
He argues that the “second republic” Khamenei has built may be “in its final days,” with a new, likely military-led regime emerging, similar to Egypt or Pakistan.
Although no senior leaders have defected and there has been little debate about structural reforms, the existential threat posed by the mass protests may raise questions within the political establishment once internal security is reestablished and US intentions are clarified.
Even if the theocratic system survives in the short term, it would be difficult to see how it will survive in the long term, according to Parsi, who noted that “the killing of protesters will further erode its legitimacy, even in the eyes of the 10-15% of the population that still support it”.
With periodic protests now a recurring feature of the Islamic Republic, the government has developed an extensive system of repression and crisis management to contain dissent.
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Kamrava explained that the state remains far from collapse and retains robust capacity. Sanctions have hollowed out civil society and weakened the middle class rather than the political elite. To compensate for its lack of political freedom and inability to deliver economic growth, the regime relies increasingly on social liberties as a panacea.
“So, if there is no American attack, I envision business as usual. Not much is going to change in Iran,” he said.
The Islamic Republic may undergo a gradual transformation within the system, according to Krieg. Clerical authority would become thinner and more ceremonial, while real power consolidates in a security-led leadership council anchored by the security services and key political institutions.
A second scenario is prolonged instability without collapse, with repeated protests, harsh repression, economic decline, and episodic local breakdowns that the central government can contain but not fully resolve.
“Full collapse is the least likely near-term scenario, largely because the system retains coercive capacity and a hard support base; it would become more plausible only if elite cohesion breaks in the security apparatus or if succession produces an uncontrollable split,” Krieg said.
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights
