Hariri is hinting at a return to politics, but Lebanon’s political landscape – and its regional backers – have shifted in ways that may limit his leverage.
Three-time former Lebanese prime minister Saad Hariri hinted at a possible political comeback during his speech at Martyr Square in Beirut to mark the 21st anniversary of his father Rafic Hariri’s assassination, four years after leaving Lebanon’s political scene.
He had previously suggested a return at the same event in 2025, when he said the Future Movement would re-enter politics, but his latest speech comes as Lebanon prepares to hold parliamentary elections later this year.
“Tell me when the elections are, and I will tell you what the Future Movement will do,” he told the crowd. “Whenever the elections happen, I promise you: They will hear our voices, and they will count our votes.”
Hariri withdrew from politics in 2022, urging the Future Movement not to participate in that year’s parliamentary elections. In his announcement, he cited Lebanon’s deep political and economic crisis, entrenched sectarianism, and Iranian influence.
His departure left a vacuum in Sunni leadership, but the upcoming Lebanese general election could provide a platform for him and the Future Movement to stage a comeback.
The vote is scheduled for 10 May, but uncertainty looms over whether it will take place as planned due to technical and security concerns.
Hariri’s return to politics, however, is expected to hinge on both domestic calculations and regional dynamics, and the Lebanese political world that would welcome him back is very different to the one he left four years ago.
The 2023 war between Hezbollah and Israel, linked to the Gaza conflict, further weakened the already fragile country’s stability. Although a ceasefire was reached in November 2024, Israel continues to bomb the country and occupy parts of southern Lebanon.
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President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam have pledged to restore the state’s monopoly on arms, including disarming Hezbollah, and pursue long-delayed reforms aimed at unlocking international aid amid Lebanon’s ongoing economic crisis.
Understanding where Hariri fits within these evolving political dynamics is crucial for assessing the impact he and his party might have. This is likely to include two main scenarios.
The first is repositioning himself as a top Sunni figure and potential prime minister by heading the Future Movement. Alternatively, he could stay behind the scenes, guiding allies and shaping decisions without holding office or party leadership.
Imad Salamey, associate professor of political science at the Lebanese American University, told The New Arab that Hariri is more likely to start indirectly, backing allies and testing the waters, before taking a direct leadership role if momentum builds.
“If Saad Hariri is to stage a meaningful political comeback, it would need to occur ahead of the next general elections in order to shape alliances and candidate lists effectively,” he told TNA. “An early re-entry would signal a serious restart rather than symbolic positioning.”
One of Hariri’s first moves came on 15 February, when he reportedly appointed his paternal aunt, Bahia Hariri, as vice president of the party. However, returning to Lebanon’s political scene will also mean taking regional dynamics into account.
Since stepping back from Lebanese politics in 2022, Hariri has been based in Abu Dhabi. In 2025, he registered an investment firm, Genesis SPV Ltd., with a plan to invest in global technology, including artificial intelligence.
The move appears to have deepened his ties to the UAE, marking a new chapter in his life, which, along with his political fortunes, has long been tied to Saudi Arabia, where he was born and where his family’s business empire was built.
In 2017, however, his ties to Riyadh cooled sharply after he announced his resignation as prime minister, reportedly under Saudi pressure to counter Iran’s rising influence in Lebanon. The move sparked a political crisis, and he rescinded it upon returning to Beirut.
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While it is unclear where relations between Hariri and the Saudi leadership currently stand, any political comeback in Lebanon is still likely to require Riyadh’s backing, according to experts.
David Wood, senior Lebanon analyst at the International Crisis Group, told TNA that both Rafic Hariri and his son Saad have historically relied on Saudi political support, and that, since 2017, Saad “hasn’t regained the level of confidence he would need from Saudi Arabia to revitalise the Harirism that made his father so popular with the Sunni community”.
Hariri’s unclear ties with Saudi Arabia do not guarantee support from the UAE, however. Recent tensions between Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have resurfaced over Yemen, with Saudi Arabia accusing the UAE of backing southern separatist forces that it says undermine its security interests.
In this context, Joseph Helou, assistant professor of political science and international affairs at the Lebanese American University, told TNA that if Hariri were to seek backing from the UAE, he would likely do so discreetly, without confronting Saudi Arabia, which remains a key player in Lebanon and the region.
“With the diminishing influence of Iran’s axis, Iran talks with the United States, and Saudi Arabia working with Oman and Qatar to encourage a US-Iran resolution rather than conflict, Saudi Arabia currently stands as a preeminent regional player,” he said.
But even with Emirati support, Salamey said that backing from the UAE alone would be insufficient to legitimise Hariri’s return.
“Hariri’s comeback without Saudi support would amount to a direct challenge to Saudi influence in Lebanon and would likely put him against other Sunni leaders and elements of the religious establishment,” he said, adding that given current Saudi-UAE dynamics, a coordinated regional consensus for his political revival does not appear likely in the near term.
Within Lebanon’s Sunni community, current political dynamics may appear favourable to Hariri. His potential return could reshape a fragmented landscape that has lacked coherent leadership since his withdrawal in 2022.
While some analyses say former rivals and independent Sunni leaders have begun to realign, with many gravitating toward Saudi-backed initiatives, significant factions remain outside these efforts, signalling persistent internal divisions and uncertainty.
While fragmentation within the Sunni community could open a window for Hariri and the Future Movement, a comeback is neither automatic nor guaranteed.
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Wood pointed out that the movement historically generated popularity not only through its policies but also through its ability to secure funding for Lebanon’s Sunni community. Even though foreign powers, particularly Saudi Arabia, appear satisfied with Prime Minister Nawaf Salam’s reform agenda, that does not automatically translate into unified Sunni backing.
“For that reason, it would be difficult to imagine the Future Movement reforming and having a significant electoral impact unless it is able to secure funding,” the ICG analyst said.
“A Hariri return without alignment with Saudi Arabia would likely deepen fragmentation rather than consolidate Sunni ranks, weakening collective leverage,” according to Salamey.
While Hariri remains a prominent figure in Lebanon’s Sunni community due to the political legacy of his father, and any return could initially generate hope among supporters, academic Joseph Helou believes that without substantial financial backing, such a comeback would likely have a limited impact beyond his core base.
“If Hariri returns empty-handed, then, just after the elections or his return, people will notice that nothing has really changed, and he will remain a leader only within his own community with a few members of parliament,” he said.
Dario Sabaghi is a freelance journalist interested in human rights
