Analysis: Gulf states are balancing deterrence, diplomacy, and regional stability as they navigate a new post-war relationship with Iran.
Caught between an increasingly confrontational United States and an emboldened Iran unwilling to surrender, the Gulf Arab monarchies face mounting security challenges.
As Washington and Tehran become locked in a dangerous cycle of escalating hostilities, the regional security framework established under the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) has steadily eroded.
With fighting over the Strait of Hormuz having reached an impasse, US President Donald Trump is threatening to strike Iranian power plants following days of attacks on targets in Ahvaz, Bandar Abbas, Bushehr, Chabahar, and other locations across the country’s southern and western regions.
This is unfolding alongside the renewed American blockade of the Strait of Hormuz following Tehran’s own closure of the waterway in response to US military strikes.
Iranian and Houthi missile and drone attacks on all six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) member-states in recent days have only further exposed the region’s profound vulnerability to conflict dynamics it cannot control.
Rather than shaping the course of events, the GCC states increasingly appear to be absorbing the consequences of the US-Iran confrontation. The central question facing the Gulf Arab monarchies is how to navigate a dangerous environment in which their security interests are directly threatened by a war over which they have limited influence.
Largely because of their geographic exposure and the uncertainty surrounding the commitments contained in the Islamabad MoU, the GCC states find themselves trapped in a deeply constrained strategic predicament.
Situated in close proximity to Iran and within range of Iranian and Houthi missile and drone capabilities, the Gulf Arab monarchies cannot distance themselves from these hostilities that directly affect their national security, economies, and critical infrastructure.
At the same time, the ambiguity of external security guarantees leaves them without a clear framework for deterring future attacks or managing escalation. The GCC states must now pursue multiple, often competing objectives: strengthening deterrence against Iran and its partners, protecting vital energy and maritime infrastructure, maintaining economic confidence, and avoiding steps that could trigger an even broader regional conflict.
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Their dilemma is therefore both immediate and structural, given that any effort to demonstrate resolve risks further escalation, while attempts at restraint may be interpreted as weakness. Caught between the need for greater security and the imperative of regional stability, the Gulf Arab monarchies face a narrowing set of choices at a moment when the costs of miscalculation have rarely been higher.
Dr Joseph A. Kéchichian, a senior fellow at the King Faisal Centre in Riyadh, outlined the three major concerns shared by the GCC states. First is the issue of safe navigation in the Gulf and particularly through the Strait of Hormuz. “Closures, and there will be more of them in the days and weeks ahead, limit global commerce. This does not serve GCC interests,” he told The New Arab.
Second are serious issues surrounding this question of payment for services for all ships transiting the Strait of Hormuz. “It is now clear that some form of payment will be instituted, which will illustrate a major American loss, given that Washington wants no fees,” observed Dr Kéchichian.
Third is the longer-term positioning of Iran in the region as a “hegemonic neighbour that is going nowhere, and with whom Arab Gulf monarchies must learn how to live after the latest war,” he noted.
Diverging strategies toward Iran
The Gulf Arab countries have responded to the latest escalation with Iran in markedly different ways, reflecting the absence of a unified regional strategy toward Tehran.
On one end of the spectrum, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Kuwait – the three GCC members most heavily targeted by Iran during this conflict – have adopted predominantly security-focused approaches to dealing with the Islamic Republic.
At the other end, Qatar and Oman have remained committed to diplomatic engagement, continuing their mediation efforts despite coming under Iranian attack themselves. Saudi Arabia, meanwhile, has pursued a strategy of strategic hedging, seeking to balance deterrence with diplomatic flexibility.
“Ayatollah Khamenei’s funeral exemplifies the different ways GCC states are positioning themselves vis-à-vis Iran in the wake of the apparent collapse of the US-Iranian ceasefire. Saudi Arabia, Oman, and Qatar sent representatives to the funeral earlier this month, while Kuwait, Bahrain, and the UAE stayed away,” explained Gordon Gray, a former US ambassador to Tunisia, in a TNA interview.
These divergent responses have left the GCC without a publicly articulated, coherent strategy toward Iran, even if some analysts believe coordination may continue behind the scenes. Tehran is eager to exploit this lack of unity among the Gulf Arab monarchies.
As long as the GCC states remain divided in their approaches, Iran can continue tailoring its policies toward individual members in ways that advance its own interests.
