Beyond the immediate implications for oil markets, the UAE’s OPEC exit underscores a broader geopolitical shift amid a widening rivalry with Saudi Arabia.
Late last month, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) made headlines by announcing its decision to leave the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and OPEC+.
On 1 May, the UAE officially left both, marking a significant shake-up for the organisation that coordinates oil production among some of the world’s largest producers. Just two days later, the UAE exited the Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries.
Having joined OPEC in 1967 through the Emirate of Abu Dhabi, the UAE long stood among the cartel’s most influential members. Given its rank as OPEC’s third-largest producer and OPEC+’s fourth, the UAE’s exit removes a key swing producer, weakening the group’s responsiveness to market changes.
As the world’s eighth-largest oil producer, the UAE, alongside its long-serving energy minister Suhail Al Mazrouei, consistently played a leading role in negotiation and dialogue.
In periods of tension, frequently involving founding member Iran, the UAE was often relied upon to help defuse conflict, serving as an effective mediator.
The UAE’s departure will allow the country to increase its oil output independently, especially once exports through the Strait of Hormuz resume, with potential ramifications for the balance of power in global energy markets.
The decision follows a comprehensive review of the UAE’s energy strategy, with Al Mazrouei emphasising that Abu Dhabi made this move to advance the UAE’s national interests.
While the UAE has long respected Saudi Arabia’s leadership within the group, Abu Dhabi seeks greater flexibility to pursue ambitious production goals, including achieving five million barrels per day by 2027.
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The exit comes amid regional tensions, including Iranian missile and drone attacks on military and civilian targets in the UAE following the launch of America and Israel’s war on the Islamic Republic in late February, and the subsequent dual blockade of the Strait of Hormuz, which has constrained the UAE’s oil exports.
Beyond the immediate market implications, the UAE’s exit underscores a broader geopolitical shift.
The UAE has strengthened ties with the United States and Israel, carving out its own influence in the Middle East and Africa, and distancing itself from Saudi Arabia on key economic and geopolitical issues such as Somalia and Somaliland, Sudan, Israel and Palestine, and Yemen.
For OPEC, the departure of one of its few members with significant spare production capacity raises questions about the sustainability of the organisation’s role as a stabiliser in global oil markets, while consumers and economies could benefit from potential increases in supply.
A push for greater autonomy from Saudi influence
The US-Israeli war on Iran was not the proximate cause for the UAE’s decision to leave OPEC. However, it seems that the war gave Abu Dhabi the chance to take this action, which it had spent years mulling.
“The UAE had long been pondering an exit from OPEC, but the war accelerated a shift already underway in pursuit of strategic autonomy away from OPEC discipline and toward even closer alignment with the US,” said Dr Sanam Vakil, the director of the Middle East and North Africa Programme at Chatham House, in an interview with The New Arab.
To understand the UAE’s quest to break away from a Saudi-dominated institution such as OPEC, it is necessary to consider the historical context.
Patrick Theros, the former US ambassador to Qatar, explained that an Emirati view of the Saudi state as “predatory” has long informed the UAE’s perspective on the Kingdom.
“Historically, the smaller states of the Gulf have depended on alliances with major outside powers to protect themselves from whoever governs the Nejd. The Nejdi tribes have constantly attacked, whether for booty or for conquest, since time immemorial. The modern Saudi state sent the White Army to occupy Buraimi (Al-Ain) in 1952, almost precipitating a US versus UK war,” he told TNA.
“The UAE has decided it will not depend so much on foreign assistance but confront the Kingdom on its own. UAE support for Yemeni separatists and the Saudi reaction should be seen in this light. Pulling out of OPEC not only has some important economic advantages for the UAE. It does not have to conform to Saudi-imposed quotas, but reduces Saudi influence in the Gulf,” added Theros.
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Exiting OPEC was a clear signal from the UAE that it will no longer remain in Saudi Arabia’s shadow or simply follow Riyadh’s lead. Abu Dhabi intends to act decisively in accordance with Emirati national interests, a stance that now shapes nearly every facet of the UAE’s policies.
The UAE’s exit from OPEC challenges the Saudi-led status quo in the Arab region. It was not lost on observers that the UAE’s announced withdrawal from the cartel occurred the same day that an emergency Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit was held in Jeddah for the purpose of addressing the Iranian threat to Gulf Arab states.
As a consequence of the Emirati announcement, the international press focused on Abu Dhabi’s exit from OPEC instead of the GCC summit’s affirmation of a “unified Gulf stance” against Tehran’s aggression.
“It’s not meant to be provocative against the Saudis, but it is a demonstration that the UAE is no longer willing to let Riyadh take the lead and simply follow dutifully,” explained Dr Hussein Ibish, a senior resident scholar at the Arab Gulf States Institute, in a TNA interview.
![Hormuz [Getty]](https://www.newarab.com/sites/default/files/styles/large_16_9/public/2271914484.jpeg?h=52bad4fe&itok=sFd_0IyJ)
“Over the past year we have been seeing that in almost every field in which the two countries find themselves in competition, and Abu Dhabi’s withdrawal from OPEC+ is another indication that the UAE is following its own drummer because the quotas that were being allowed via membership in that Saudi-dominated organisation, with Russia as a close secondary partner, were not sufficient for the UAE’s point of view,” he added.
The UAE aims to capitalise on and sell its oil as quickly as possible, whereas most other major exporters prioritise conserving their reserves, selling more gradually to maximise long-term value.
“The UAE is so far along in its economic diversification program that it no longer feels bound to highly limited quotas designed to preserve existing stocks and instead wants to ‘drill, baby drill,’ as fossil fuel enthusiasts in the US put it,” said Dr Ibish.
