Khazali, a central figure within the ruling Shia Coordination Framework, appears aware of the sensitivity of the moment.
Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr has shaken Iraq’s political and security landscape with a dramatic decision to sever ties between his movement and its armed wing, Saraya al-Salam, placing the powerful militia under the authority of the state in a move that has reignited debate over weapons outside government control.
What initially appeared to be an internal organisational step quickly evolved into a major political development with implications for the entire Shia political camp, exposing divisions among Iraq’s armed factions at a moment when Baghdad faces mounting domestic and international pressure to restore state authority over the security sector.
Sadr’s announcement came unexpectedly when he declared that Saraya al-Salam would be formally separated from the Shia National Movement and integrated into state institutions. The move was immediately welcomed by Prime Minister Ali al-Zaidi, whose government is struggling with the sensitive challenge of dealing with heavily armed factions that have accumulated extensive political, military and economic influence over the past two decades.
The decision carries particular significance because it comes from one of Iraq’s most influential Shia leaders and the head of a movement with a vast grassroots following and a long history of armed mobilisation.
Over recent years, Sadr has repeatedly clashed politically and militarily with rival Shia factions. This time, however, he appeared intent on delivering a different message: that Iraq cannot function as a stable state while power and weapons remain divided between official institutions and armed groups operating beyond full government control.
The move placed rival militia leaders in an awkward position. It has become increasingly difficult for them to openly reject calls for restricting weapons to the state after such an initiative was launched by a figure deeply embedded in Iraq’s armed Shia political establishment.
Among the first to respond was Qais al-Khazali, leader of Asaib Ahl al-Haq, whose movement and parliamentary wing, the Sadiqoun bloc, quickly reaffirmed support for the principle that weapons should remain exclusively under state authority.
Movement officials said regulating weapons represented a “national position” aimed at preventing foreign powers, particularly the United States, from using the issue of armed factions as justification for further pressure on Baghdad.
In an Eid al-Adha sermon, Khazali stressed the importance of building a strong state with sovereign institutions, arguing that “resistance” could no longer remain limited to military activity but had to evolve into a broader state-building project.
Yet despite the political importance of such statements, many observers see them less as evidence of genuine transformation and more as an attempt to adapt to the political momentum created by Sadr’s move.
Asaib Ahl al-Haq has not spoken about dismantling its military structures or dissolving its command hierarchy. Instead, it insists it already operates legally under the umbrella of the Popular Mobilisation Forces, the state-funded security institution established after the war against ISIS.
This reflects one of the central dilemmas facing the Iraqi state. Many armed factions already consider themselves part of the state through the PMF while simultaneously maintaining independent command structures and ideological loyalties that extend beyond official military chains of command.
As a result, the debate over restricting weapons to the state is no longer simply about funding or legal status, but about who ultimately controls the use of force.
Khazali, a central figure within the ruling Shia Coordination Framework, appears aware of the sensitivity of the moment. Preserving the current political order serves the interests of factions participating in government, while easing American pressure on Baghdad benefits both the government and the armed groups aligned with it.
Not all factions, however, view the issue through the same lens.
Groups closely tied to Iran’s regional Axis of Resistance continue to see their weapons as a strategic necessity linked to broader regional calculations rather than domestic politics alone.
Among the most vocal opponents of disarmament is Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, whose spokesman Kazem al-Fartousi rejected the idea of surrendering weapons under current conditions.
Fartousi argued that what he described as continuing foreign threats and violations of Iraqi sovereignty justified preserving “resistance weapons,” adding that his faction opposed fully integrating armed groups into the security establishment because each faction had “its own role and special circumstances.”
The dispute reflects fundamentally different visions of the Iraqi state.
Supporters of limiting weapons to official institutions argue that monopolising force is essential for building a stable state. Opponents insist armed factions remain necessary because of ongoing regional and security threats.
These competing positions highlight how far Iraq remains from fully resolving the issue of weapons outside state authority despite years of political transition.
The problem is no longer simply the existence of militias outside the law. It has become intertwined with a complex network of political, economic and security interests that turned armed power itself into part of Iraq’s governing structure.
By moving first, Sadr succeeded in politically embarrassing his rivals and forcing them into a difficult public test. But the success of his initiative will ultimately depend on whether the Iraqi state can transform slogans into enforceable measures, and whether armed factions are genuinely willing to surrender their independent sources of power.
In today’s Iraq, the central question is no longer who publicly supports restricting weapons to the state, but who is prepared to accept the state as the sole decision-maker when its interests conflict with those of the militias.
That question may ultimately determine whether Iraq evolves into a state that truly monopolises force, or remains a system where armed factions continue to wield power both inside and outside official institutions.
