As BRICS held a virtual Extraordinary Joint Meeting in late November, the group informally agreed to condemn Israel’s ongoing war in Gaza and expressed concern over the plight of civilians in the besieged enclave.
“We condemned any kind of individual or mass forcible transfer and deportation of Palestinians from their own land,” a statement read, chaired by South African president Cyril Ramaphosa, although a joint declaration was not issued.
Yet reflecting the divisions within the group, founding member state India took a milder approach. Indian external affairs minister S. Jaishankar reiterated calls for a two-state solution but did not hold Israel accountable for Palestinian civilian deaths in Gaza, which by that stage had reached 11,000, instead focusing on Hamas’ 7 October attack.
“India’s growing proximity to Israel has been evident since establishing diplomatic relations in 1992, with the relationship intensifying under Narendra Modi’s government”
India’s softened critique, while quietly deepening ties with both Israel and, more broadly, the United States, marks a divergence from fellow BRICS members – Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa – each of whom has separately denounced Israel’s actions in Gaza. It also reflects a profound split within BRICS, often seen as a counterweight to Western global influence.
Moreover, on the sidelines of the COP28 climate change conference in Dubai, concerns over the violence in Gaza were raised by multiple leaders, officials, and delegates. Speaking to Israeli President Isaac Herzog, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi reportedly reiterated India’s support for a two-state solution and a resolution to the Gaza war.
Ultimately, however, India’s growing proximity to Israel has been evident since establishing diplomatic relations in 1992. This relationship has intensified under Narendra Modi’s government, highlighted by Modi’s historic visit in 2017, marking the first trip of an Indian Prime Minister to Israel.
Such actions signal a departure from India’s long-standing policy of non-alignment among great powers, a stance maintained since its independence in 1947 and outlined as “actively neutral” by its first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, which it devoutly followed throughout the Cold War while upholding a largely pro-Palestinian stance. RELATED
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Departing from non-alignment
In the post-Cold War era, India maintained a low profile in commenting on conflicts, including those in the Middle East. For instance, despite global criticism from the Global South towards the US-led Iraq war in 2003, India largely remained neutral as the invasion took place.
More recently, in the wake of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, India fortified its commercial and diplomatic ties with Russia as it faced Western sanctions, thus becoming an increasingly significant ally for Moscow. Trade turnover between India and Russia more than doubled in the first half of 2022, with an increase of nearly 120%.
This paradox of balancing the West’s ties with Russia is perfectly illustrated by India’s importing of Russian crude oil and subsequently selling it to Europe, despite Western sanctions on Russia. Yet apart from its dalliance with Moscow, which may even be plateauing, India is increasingly positioning itself within the US-led order.
