During a visit by a high-level Turkish delegation to Iraq last month, Baghdad announced a ban on the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) – a significant gesture following months of increased pressure from the government in Ankara.
In a joint statement issued by Turkey and Iraq after meetings last month, both sides “stressed that the PKK organisation represents a security threat to both Turkey and Iraq” and pledged to “intensify work to adopt a memorandum of understanding”.
Baghdad stopped short of aligning with Turkey, as well as the US, the UK, and the EU, by not formally designating the PKK as a terrorist organisation.
“Erdogan’s new government is not ready to develop any new opening process or a peace process with the PKK, that’s why [their strategy is] to pressure northern Iraq”
The significant opening comes ahead of an expected visit by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan to Baghdad in mid-April, his first in over ten years. He has issued warnings about an imminent large-scale military operation targeting the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan.
The PKK has waged an insurgency against Turkey since 1984, seeking Kurdish self-rule. The conflict, with its epicentre in Turkey’s southeast, is commonly estimated to have killed between 30,000 and 40,000 people since then, including civilians.
In recent years, however, much of the fighting has moved to northern Iraq’s semi-autonomous Kurdish region, where the group has its headquarters and where Turkey, which has established several military bases there, has routinely been conducting air strikes.
Pressure from Turkey has intensified since former intelligence chief Hakan Fidanwas appointed to the role of foreign minister last year.
“After the May 2023 election, the cabinet of President Erdogan has changed dramatically,” Ahmet Ozturk, a senior lecturer in politics and international relations at London Metropolitan University, told The New Arab, referring in particular to the appointment of Fidan, as well as intelligence head Ibrahim Kalin and defence Minister Yasar Guler.
The latter told reporters after the meeting in Baghdad last month that Turkey planned to establish a “joint operations centre” with Iraq.
“In Turkey, foreign policy and domestic politics have overlapped immensely over the last couple of years,” Ozturk says. “Erdogan’s new government is not ready to develop any new opening process or a peace process with the PKK, that’s why [their strategy is] to pressure northern Iraq.”
Mohammed A. Salih, a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Institute, told TNA that the PKK ban is significant but mostly on a symbolic level.
“Baghdad does not really have the means or the control over the PKK in Iraqi Kurdistan areas to assert this kind of ban in any meaningful way.”
“The two countries have a number of shared interests, including shared water resources and oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Turkey is also one of Iraq’s main trade partners”
Leverage in the region
The two countries have a number of shared interests, including shared water resources and oil exports through the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline. Turkey is also one of Iraq’s main trade partners, and Turkish goods have a dominant presence in Iraq.
The establishment of an alternative trade route that will connect countries in the Persian Gulf with Turkey and then Europe is likely to top the economic agenda during Erdogan’s visit. Known as the Development Road project, this will be a road and rail corridor between Basra and Turkey touted as the ‘new Silk Road’.
“Iraq has shown a lot of willingness, especially under the current government of Prime Minister Sudani, to engage Turkey on this,” Salih says. “It’s also mutually beneficial for Turkey, which is undergoing difficult economic conditions.”
“But the water question is really very vital for Iraq, especially given climate change concerns and the fact that there’s an increasing displacement of populations in southern parts of Iraq due to drought and lack of water,” Salih says.
Turkey and Iraq have been in a dispute over water rights, with Iraq seeking a fair share of water from the Tigris and Euphrates rivers – which account for more than 90 per cent of the country’s freshwater. Turkey has built several dams on the rivers.
“It’s more important for Baghdad to receive President Erdogan than for President Erdogan himself to visit Baghdad,” says Aydin Selcen, a former Turkish diplomat in Iraq. “Baghdad really has to offer something.”
Another question on the table is the Kirkuk-Ceyhan oil pipeline, Iraq’s largest and vital for exports from the Kurdistan region, which has been shut since March last year following an international arbitration court ruling. Its closure is estimated to have cost Iraq, and particularly Iraqi Kurdistan, between $11 and $12 billion.
“The oil question is more important for the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG),” Salih explains. “Iraq is already exporting large amounts of oil at very high prices thanks to the war in Ukraine and the conflict in Gaza.”
“The memorandum of understanding after president Erdogan’s visit to Baghdad will probably say that Baghdad and Ankara are now looking eye to eye and there will be some future cooperation on various fronts,” says Selcen, the former diplomat.
“What that will mean is that it will allow Ankara to have a sort of a legal basis for its ongoing operations.”
Ylenia Gostoli is a reporter currently based in Istanbul, Turkey. She has covered politics, social change, and conflict across the Middle East and Europe. Her work on refugees, migration, and human trafficking has won awards and grants.
