As the Houthis and Israel battle in the Red Sea, it’s important not to oversimplify issues in a regional war that grows more complex, writes Riad al Khouri.
Though Gaza remains at the heart of Israel’s regional aggression, the Red Sea is an increasingly critical theatre in the fighting. This was dramatically illustrated over the past week by violent escalations between Israel and Yemen’s Houthis, who on Friday for the first time hit central Tel Aviv near the US consulate.
The Israelis retaliated the following day with their first-ever large-scale air raid on the Yemeni port of Hodeida, bombing oil and gas depots, a power station, and cranes, all of which Israel alleges are used in Houthi military operations. That in turn quickly prompted the Houthis to send missiles against Israel’s southern port of Eilat.
The exchanges, which had been going on in one form or another but at a lower intensity for some months, are part of spillover from Israel’s war on Gaza drawing in global and regional powers. These include the Houthis who have in support of the Palestinians fired at Israel more than 200 times since October 7 using increasingly sophisticated weapons.
The Yemeni group has also from October attacked Israeli or Israel-bound shipping in the Arabian Sea and Bab al Mandeb straits including from last month by using more sophisticated ballistic missiles, with three ships sunk or heavily damaged in the area since June. The Houthis also claimed a few weeks ago to have targeted the American aircraft carrier Eisenhower — the US denied the attack — which had been patrolling regional waters — though it seems to limited avail as Houthi disruption of shipping remains significant.
Yet it was the most recent attack on Tel Aviv that has markedly raised the political and geostrategic temperature, prompting, for example the Wall Street Journal to editorialise around the subject on 21 July under the headline “The Triumph of the Houthis (and Iran)” remarking that “The US told Israel it would deter the terrorists in Yemen. It has failed.”
A more confusing Red Sea
However, such Kabuki-style presentations of conflict — gallant American attempts at deterrence in the service of a righteous Israel threatened by terrorist Houthis allied to evil Iranians — by Western mainstream media and others can help to confuse rather than simplify.
Though clearer dichotomies may be apparent elsewhere, for example in the western Pacific with its Sino-American friction, no such clarity is evident in the latest phase of the Israeli-Palestinian struggle and its spillover. This is especially true when looking at events in the Red Sea, a vital part of China’s Belt & Road initiative — rivalled by the US-backed India-Mideast Corridor, which is planned to go through the Arab Gulf.
Houthi attacks from Yemen on China-bound cargoes and on Chinese ships, even while American naval power purports to offer this protection, show how complicated great power relations can be when brought down to a local level.
The principle of “my enemy’s enemy is a friend” breaks down as ships carrying goods to or from China, otherwise, an adversary of a pro-Israel US, is hit by anti-Israelis from Yemen. Irrespective of other considerations, an open and peaceful Red Sea zone is important for China, which though a great power is nevertheless not as directly involved in the region as the US. However, this may slowly be changing, as shown for example in this week’s meeting of Palestinian factions in Beijing under Chinese auspices.
In any case, whatever the ships’ nationality or destination, navigation in the Red Sea remains subject to severe disruption, which has many implications for countries other than Israel.
To give but two “non-Israeli” regional examples of disruptions, there has since October been a sharp drop in Suez Canal earnings and a collapse of traffic by cruise ships to destinations such as Jordan. These among other issues show how Houth actions, inadvertent or otherwise, have implications for regional countries apart from Israel.
Old and new dichotomies
One of the many lessons in the aftermath of October 7 is a change in or shift of relevance of previously accepted geopolitical dichotomy. For example, given present postures and alliances in the region, the term “Arabs vs Israelis” looks very blurred. As well, the “US-China rivalry” apparent in the Pacific, and a “Russia vs America” configuration as seen in Europe are both changing and evolving in our region.
In and near the Red Sea, as elsewhere regionally, things are likely to become even more confused over the coming months as America’s global posture shifts.
The lesson here is not to transpose sides in a geopolitical conflict from one geographical zone to another. Also, Manichean notions of black-hatted villains opposing decent people in their white hats should remain instruments of Western propaganda, not be part of thoughtful analysis. The Red Sea is not a geopolitical fault line, except in the pop culture Manicheism of the Western mainstream media.
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Finally, a word about the Yemenis. In one of my many missions to northern Yemen, a member of the north’s elite was discussing his country’s business climate with me. Comparing Yemen’s foreign investment law with that of my country Jordan, I remarked that the Yemeni legislation was better, showing less restrictions against and more tolerance for outsiders. “Yes,” he replied with a smile, “we were never occupied, like you.”
Years later, for better or worse, Yemenis continue to show an independence of spirit, but that is now also interacting with resistance in Gaza. This is another new phenomenon in a post-October 7 Arab world that is becoming less amenable to examination from an older simpler point of view.
Riad al Khouri is an independent Jordanian economist
