In-depth: The proposed UN peace roadmap for Yemen largely reflects bilateral talks between Saudi Arabia and the Houthis, with other warring parties frozen out.
“The war in Gaza has taken the focus off the other conflicts in the region, including Yemen… Yemen needs to be back on the agenda in terms of achieving a long-lasting peace settlement.”
This is what Mohamed al-Sahimi, the UK representative of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), recently told The New Arab when we sat down to discuss the status of the road map for peace and what the future holds for the STC in Yemen.
The current peace talks are, unsurprisingly, driven by different ambitions.
For Saudi Arabia and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, there is a strong desire to get out of a conflict that has achieved little, sucked up considerable military resources, and cost the Gulf nation no small amount of international capital.
For the Iran-backed Houthis, also known as Ansar Allah, the goal is to maintain the position they hold and not give up the control they have secured across large parts of the country.
While both are major players in Yemen, neither is officially considered to be the internationally recognised ruling authority.
That honour falls to the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), led by President Rashad al-Alimi.
Established as the internationally recognised government in April 2022, the seven-seat body includes three representatives from the Southern Transitional Council (STC).
The STC was established in May of 2017, although its roots can be found in the al-Hirak al-Janoubi (the Southern Movement), a southern secessionist movement.
On 4 May 2017, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, the former governor of the southern Yemeni city of Aden, delivered what came to be known as the ‘Aden Historic Declaration’, and seven days later, the STC was brought into existence.
emen’s peace process
In April 2022, an effort to end the years of brutal fighting in Yemen was launched and a UN-brokered ceasefire was announced. It represented the best path to peace that the country had seen in years, but no one expected it to be easy.
The ceasefire expired in October of 2022, but to the relief of many, the fighting did not resume with the same ferocity.
Hopes that a broad church of ideas would be heard in negotiations quickly evaporated when it became apparent that Saudi Arabia and the Iran-backed Houthis would fill the only two seats at the table, with other interested parties, including the Southern Transitional Council, and more generally the PLC, frozen out.
Subsequently, enthusiasm among the PLC was low, and it was anticipated that the Houthis would be granted more concessions than was palatable to those opposing them.
The efforts are supported by the United Nations, and its Special Envoy Hans Grundberg, who has been trying to secure greater levels of support for the talks from anti-Houthi groups.
“They [anti-Houthi groups] are not keen to do so though. They were not included in the negotiations between Saudi Arabia and Ansar Allah that led to the roadmap, and nor was the UN, or Grundberg, as some say,” explained Dr Jens Heibach, Research Fellow at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies, to TNA.
While the STC does profess support for the peace process, it is frustrated by the narrow participation.
“It was mainly a consultation between the Houthis and the Saudis with mediators. It wasn’t an inclusive process, so that we can all say ‘this is our map, and this is the map that we want in order to make it work,’” explained al-Sahimi.
“The STC are very outspoken about this. They feel they can push their claims because of their being backed by the UAE. So, do they deserve to be part of the talks? Yes, as every Yemeni party to the conflict deserves to be part of the talks,” said Heibach.
“It is important to understand that the STC, regardless of their claim to represent all Southerners, are not uncontested in the South. Likewise, it is key to understand that the weakness of the anti-Houthi camp is also due to the ongoing Saudi-Emirati rivalry,” he continued
For the STC, they believe that if the peace talks continue on their current Saudi-Houthi-centric path, then they will only end one way.
“Without the cooperation, we think it’s going to be a traffic accident,” claims al-Sahimi. He also expressed the STC’s frustration with the timing of the roadmap and a lack of clarity about its framing and transparency.
“We really don’t know what’s included within the roadmap. And this is one of the issues that we’re having in terms of whether to accept this roadmap or not. But I think it is very important for us to look at the roadmap as a comprehensive solution for the crisis, including the economic situation.”
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Initially, the much-needed peace process made some progress, mainly demonstrated by prisoner swaps, but it has been limited and slow.
With the ongoing attacks by the Houthis in the Red Sea, in support of Gaza, and more recently, directly against Israel with a drone attack, the desire for progress has grown.
Eye-catching and a threat to international shipping and trade, the Houthi attacks and seizing of Israeli-linked commercial ships turned international eyes back to the Gulf.
Between October 2023 to March 2024, the Houthis attacked more than 60 vessels in the Red Sea, according to a US Congressional report. In January 2024, the trading route witnessed a 78 drop in expected traffic, as ships sought a safe route.
Amid these attacks, the US and UK led an air campaign against the Houthis, hoping to dissuade the group or dampen their capabilities. So far, these efforts have not been effective, as was widely predicted.
“Apparently, the US gave Saudi Arabia a green light to move forward with the roadmap in mid-May despite Washington’s ongoing campaign against Ansar Allah,” according to Heibach.
But despite renewed impetus, the lack of inclusivity in the talks has, in the opinion of the STC, not improved.
“The only thing the parties of the anti-Houthi camp can do to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the Houthis is to come to terms with each other”
“It’s still the same. It’s probably got worse now with the Houthi attacks on the Red Sea, which have completely changed the scene now and the context of any peace initiatives. And we think that needs to be re-calibrated into something workable now,” al-Sahimi said.
For the likes of the US, the theory was fairly obvious. They believed that if a peace deal could be struck, then attacks in the Red Sea would cease, or at least be significantly scaled back, without the need for a ceasefire in Gaza.
To date, the attacks have continued.
But despite the lack of progress by the US and UK, the STC wants the strikes on the Houthis to continue, and even increase.
Perhaps unsurprisingly for the anti-Houthi party, the continued military strength of the Iran-backed group is a considerable sticking point, with its capacities having increased significantly in recent years.
“If you are observing the Houthis military capacity two years ago, they couldn’t reach Riyadh and Saudi Arabia, or three years ago, but now they can reach beyond Riyadh. So then how are they so that their attacks are more accurate? That means that their military capacity is improving,” explained Mahmoud Shehrah, a former Yemeni diplomat and Associate Fellow at Chatham House, to TNA.
To remedy this, al-Sahimi says the STC wants to see the international community increase pressure on the group.
“Because without that, without taking that responsibility, I think the Houthis will probably be a problem in the region, they are at the moment. And we have seen that they are not a reliable partner in the region, and they can use the Red Sea and the attacks in order to gain more leverage over any peace deal.”
Al-Sahimi also expressed the desire of the STC to see the Houthis hit in the wallet.
“I think there needs to be targeted sanctions on the Houthis. In order to prevent any more financial and military support to this stage.”
Individuals with links to the Houthis, for example, Said al-Jamal, an Iran-based financier, have been sanctioned by the US. Despite this, smuggling continues to create vast revenues for the group.
“I think we are going to have a problem with the Houthis weaponising themselves with the bulk of money that they’re going to get from this roadmap, and it will become stronger. So, they will be more of a security threat,” al-Sahimi said, calling for more support for the PLC.
The anti-Houthi bloc is united in their opposition to the Houthis, but separately they still represent different groups within Yemen, with differing politics, ideologies, and interests.
This raises an interesting question when it comes to the idea of supporting the PLC. If a foreign nation does decide to support defence efforts, then who does it support?
While there is an internationally recognised government in Yemen, there is still no unified military force in the country. Each group continues to maintain its own army.
The British or Americans could, for example, provide training and capacity building for naval efforts, but without a unified military, it would have to be provided to one particular group, at the expense of another.
And future prospects for a unified military force look distant, according to Heibach.
“Seeing the enmity that exists between the members of the PLC I seriously doubt they can be successful,” he said.
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“One reason for the 1994 civil war was the unwillingness of both the YSP and the GPC to give up control of their armies despite unification. During basically all periods of Yemen’s recent contemporary history, almost all significant political actors could each resort to their own force, be it tribal, military, paramilitary.”
Given Yemen’s recent history, establishing the PLC was a fairly monumental achievement, but it is by no means perfect, and there is certainly room for it to be strengthened.
For al-Sahimi, it’s a question of funding.
“I think the funding that’s received by the government might not be enough to provide services and there are also issues with the central bank. Now, in Yemen, we have two central banks. We have two parliaments. And so literally we are two states.”
The theory is right, but as always, it’s not just about how much money is available, it’s about where the money goes and how it is spent, with corruption a perennial problem.
In 2023, Transparency International, who “advocate for anti-corruption policy”, according to their website, ranked Yemen 176th out of 180 countries.
Funding could be an answer to the PLC’s problems and is likely part of a solution, but there is a more fundamental issue with the body.
While the PLC is mostly unified by their disdain for the Houthis, they remain fragmented by their own ambitions and visions for Yemen’s future, how areas should be governed, and who should govern.
And as unpalatable as their methods and ideologies are to many, a future Yemen without the Houthis looks simply unrealistic.
In time, either before, or after, a peace plan is agreed between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, the PLC is going to have to engage in talks with the Houthis. When that moment comes, they are going to have to reach a solution with them, and compromise will have to come from all sides.
“The power of PLC parties greatly hinges on their relationships with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, and both states are pursuing their own interests, which may, or may not, overlap with those of their Yemeni allies and proxies,” explained Heibach.
“As starry-eyed as it might seem today, the only thing the parties of the anti-Houthi camp can do to improve their bargaining position vis-à-vis the Houthis is to come to terms with each other.”
Without a political solution, the civil war, which has already cost the people of Yemen so much, will continue.
The peace plan in Yemen is often referred to as a roadmap. If we follow that analogy, peace in Yemen has just pulled out of the driveway.
Hugo Goodridge is the producer of The New Arab Voice podcast. He has been covering the region for the past eight years, and between 2014 and 2019 he was based in Beirut, Lebanon, where he freelanced for the BBC World Service
