In recent weeks, extremely dangerous developments have shaken the Middle East. Escalating hostilities between Israel and the United States, on one side, and Iran and the Tehran-led ‘Axis of Resistance’, on the other, have left the six Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) members nervous.
Such concerns are entirely justifiable, mindful of how an all-out war in the wider region could severely harm the GCC states’ national security and economic health.
On 1 October, Iran waged its double-wave ballistic missile attack on Israel. ‘Operation True Promise 2’ came in response to Tel Aviv’s military aggression against Lebanon, which killed Hezbollah’s third Secretary-General, Hassan Nasrallah, and Israel’s assassination of other high-ranking figures in the ‘Axis of Resistance’ at previous points this year. Now the world waits to see how, when, and where Israel retaliates.
Since that unprecedented Iranian missile attack against Israel, officials in GCC states have been engaging Tehran. This is in no small part due to their vested interests in not being the target of Iran’s wrath. This month, the Iranians have been clear that any Gulf Arab state permitting Israel and/or the United States to use any military base on their soil or airspace in any attack against Iran would be “unacceptable,” and warned of dire consequences.
Officials in all Gulf Arab states realise that Iran could easily attack their oil facilities if Tehran finds them to be supportive of an attack targeting Iran’s oil or nuclear facilities carried out by Washington or Tel Aviv. No one in the Gulf has forgotten the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019, which highlighted the ability of Tehran and the ‘Axis of Resistance’ to inflict massive harm on the kingdom’s oil-dependent economy.
The message from the Gulf Arab monarchies to the Islamic Republic’s leadership is simple: GCC members will not play any role in facilitating any Israeli and/or American attack on Iran’s homeland or Tehran’s interests in the wider region. In anticipation of what could soon be a full-scale Iran-Israel war, the Gulf Arab monarchies seek to stay out of any such conflict, refusing to align with either Tehran or Tel Aviv against the other.
Throughout this month, the GCC member states have opted for diplomacy rather than confrontation while seeking to promote dialogue as a sane alternative to warfare. On 2 and 3 October, Qatar hosted the third Asia Cooperation Dialogue (ACD) Summit, which brought Gulf Arab and Iranian officials to Doha. While in the Qatari capital, ministers from GCC states stressed the need for de-escalation and engagement.
While meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan at the ACD Summit, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian expressed Tehran’s determination to further improve his country’s relationship with the kingdom.
“We consider Islamic countries, including Saudi Arabia, as our brothers, and we emphasise the importance of setting aside differences to enhance cooperation,” the Iranian president said.
Riyadh’s chief diplomat explained that Saudi Arabia seeks to “permanently close the chapter on our differences [with Iran] and focus on resolving issues, developing relations as two friendly and brotherly countries”. Bin Farhan also told Iran’s president, “We trust in your wisdom and insight in managing the situation and contributing to peace and stability in the region”.
 While seeking to be militarily prepared for Tel Aviv’s response, Tehran is also busy with diplomatic manoeuvring vis-à-vis Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia. [Getty] |
On 9 October, Iran’s top diplomat Abbas Araghchi went to Riyadh and spoke with Saudi Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman. The following day, Araghchi visited Doha and met with Qatar’s Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman bin Jassim Al-Thani for a discussion about regional developments, chiefly the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon.
Sheikh Mohammed emphasised the necessity of regional and international efforts aimed at defusing tensions and preventing hostilities in the Middle East from expanding further while stressing that Doha stands ready to take steps aimed at strengthening security and promoting stability in the region and beyond.
Iran’s motivations
At this point, the Iranians are justifiably concerned about a potential Israeli response to ‘Operation True Promise 2’. Tehran is focused on the many risks that a broader regional war could represent to its interests. While seeking to be militarily prepared for Tel Aviv’s response, Tehran is also busy with its diplomatic manoeuvring vis-à-vis Arab states, particularly Saudi Arabia.
Messages from Tehran about any GCC member being complicit in an Israeli and/or American attack on Iran constitute both reminders and warnings to the Gulf Arab monarchies. But the other dimension here is that Iran seeks to reassure them of Tehran’s desire for continued diplomacy and détente with the Saudis and others in the Gulf even as the Middle East’s conflict dynamics continue escalating.
“Iran is determined to continue this path as long as mutual interests are respected. If Arab states are not intervening in this unfolding war between Iran and Israel, they can rest assured that their interests will be respected by Iran as well,” explained Dr Hamidreza Azizi, a visiting fellow at the German Institute for International and Security Affairs, in an interview with The New Arab.
Beyond simply trying to warn the GCC states against cooperating militarily with the American-Israeli alliance against Iran, Tehran is attempting to rally greater regional support for ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon. Mindful of the extent to which Tel Aviv has dealt major blows to Hezbollah in recent months, Israel’s military operations in Lebanon leave Tehran facing a predicament.
This factor helps explain why the Islamic Republic is pushing for a ceasefire now more than ever.
“By reminding Arab states of the risks of a broader war, the Iranian side also wants them to be on board to initiate some sort of a coordinated regional push for a ceasefire in the region,” said Dr Azizi.
Value of Saudi-Iran détente
What will come next for the Riyadh-Tehran relationship is difficult to predict given all the chaotic instability in the Middle East and the fluidity of regional developments. Yet, there is no denying that over the past 19 months the Saudi-Iran détente has proven resilient in the face of many security challenges, especially since 7 October 2023.
It is worth considering how today, amid these regional conflicts, GCC states would likely be facing much more difficult circumstances if Saudi Arabia and Iran had not signed their détente agreement in March 2023. Without that deal, Riyadh would probably be looking at the current Middle East in very different ways, especially regarding the perceived Iranian threat.
“Over the past year, at least until after the Israeli attacks against Hezbollah leadership, there has been no mention by Iranian officials of, for example, targeting the Strait of Hormuz or targeting the interests of Arab states of the Persian Gulf in retaliation for an Israeli or American attack against Iran,” Dr Azizi told TNA.
“These were main elements of the Iranian narrative before the détente agreement. So now we see a significant shift and that’s because Iran actually has seen in the war in Gaza an opportunity to try at least to further strengthen ties with Arab states, prevent the expansion of the Abraham Accords, prevent the potential formation of an anti-Iran coalition of Arab states and Israel.”
Both Riyadh and Tehran have had their own interests in building on improvements in bilateral affairs rather than returning to the hostilities of the tense 2016-21 period.
The strategic value of the Saudi-Iran détente is clear to policymakers in all GCC states and Tehran. This point helps one understand why the kingdom and the Islamic Republic remain determined to ensure that tensions are mitigated and contained while dialogue is kept open.
But there is also a risk of Saudi Arabia and Iran’s détente unravelling. “Of course, the challenges are increasing now that Iran has started to feel an existential threat by the significant weakening of its most important ally, Hezbollah, and by a potential Israeli attack against its homeland,” said Dr Azizi.
