Chairman, Dr Saeed Shehabi: The Arab world has been stagnant for years but suddenly it erupted in revolutions, upheavals, momemtum seeking events but the long awaited change is still to come. There has been some change. Nobody could have anticipated the extent, the ferocity and the speed of the change that has happened so far.
Not only the speech of change but also the speed of resistance to change from certain quarters be they the regimes in the area or those who do not want to see transition to democracy. So when we discuss and debate the events of the past two or three months we will be faced by momentous events that are both significant in themselves and in their consquences to the region and to the world.
Nothing much has happened yet. Still we saw the price of oil jumping to more than $100 a barrel and there is the anticipation that it could jump to $200 a barrel according to some forecasts if the situation in Libya or in Yemen and of course in Saudi Arabia takes a turn for the worst.
Whatever happens the new Middle East is unlikely to be the same as the one we lived in during the past five decades. The balance of power in the region has changed and those who have lived and those who have designed their policies on the assumption that we have puppets there forever have to ree-xamine their policies. Not necessarily that their interests will be affected and will be challenged severely but they will be forced to deal with people on an equal footing to a degree and also to deal with them on a one to one basis. So far that has not been happening. I do not see a major challenge to the supply of oil in the future because I don’t think anybody wishes to do that and the people have not been campaigning to change their regimes in order to control or to affect the world economically but if that is to be done because of action from here and there it could be done.
But on the face of it we are witnessing a transition from absolute dictatorships and absolute monarchies to a degree of civil society in action, a degree of political opneness where the people have some role to play and that is why we are here tonight trying to shed some light on these events.
As you know the transition to democracy in the Middle East will be very much debated and we need to wait and see whether it will materialise or not and the degree to which it will materialise. We know that there have been reasonably successful revolutions in Egypt and Tunisia and there is on going strife in Libya, in Yemen and in Bahrain of course where I come from myself.
We will be discussing the transition to democracy in Egypt and how quick and effective it will be in introducing the model that we need. I for one would like to see what kind of Egypt will emerge from all of this because I have always believed that Egypt is the gateway to change in the Middle East and we have had a bad 40 years since Nasser died in which the Arab world has been going from bad to worse. Are we going to be better off in the next few years? Egypt is the key. If the Egyptians manage to create good governance, that will reflect on the rest of the Middle East. If the powers who are working in the dark manage to contain the revolution then we are likely to stagnate again but the hope is that we will not. Our second speaker will discuss democracy had how it is going to influence the region and the dynamics that are likely to determine the future governments and the future regimes of the Middle East.
Dr Corinna Mullin: On 17 December 2010 Mohamed Bouaziz, a young unemployed father of six, whose attempts to support his family were thwarted by a repressive and corrupt bureaucracy, set himself on fire in a final act of desperate and anguished protest that sparked the Jasmine Revolution.
In the weeks that followed, protest which began in the impoverished areas in south of the country, began making their way towards the capital, culminating in mass protests and strikes that led to the forced resignation of president Ben Ali, the collapse of his long-entrenched authoritarian regime, and the formation of a transitional government in its place.
The reverberations of the Tunisian revolution are still being felt across the region today. In Egypt, on February 11th, after weeks of mass protests, Mubarak’s 30 yr dictatorial rule came to an end, we have witnessed popular mobilisation and rebellion in other countries across North Africa and the Middle East, including Libya, Algeria, Yemen, Bahrain, Oman and Saudi Arabia.
In those countries were the revolutions have been successful in their key demand of overthrowing the regime, there is no doubt that much remains to be done. The situation still remains fluid with concerns being expressed by opposition leaders, activists and human rights experts that the transition will only be superficial, and therefore demanding the transitional governments consolidate the progress made over the last few weeks/months and comply with promises made to, amongst other things, hold free and fair elections in the near future in which all members of society can participate freely; implement much-needed judicial and constitutional reform to allow for the repeal of all restrictions on civil liberties, free expression, organisation and assembly; the establishment of independent trade unions; and the enforcement of respect for human rights
In Tunisia and Egypt there are also serious concerns regarding transitional justice- including demands for investigations into the crimes committed by security forces during the revolutions, as well as those committed during the period of dictatorial rule, with those found responsible brought to justice and reparations for victims.
Though many of the demands of the past and ongoing revolutions were political in nature, it has also been widely acknowledged that economic factors have played a large role with one of the key demands being that the structural factors responsible for the unrest in the first place, many of which were often caused or exacerbated by the economic policies of western states and international financial institutions, are addressed. These include: economic stratification, high levels of unemployment and poverty, and inadequate employment opportunities.
In addition to the economic and political demands made by the protestors, another key demand has been a restoration of the people’s dignity. As has been evident in many of the protest slogans and posters, the people are calling for Karama wa hura! This demand for dignity I believe has two dimensions- one concerned with the dignity of the individual, which has been repeatedly violated by the dictators of the region through corruption, violence, and general oppression, and, secondly, the dignity of the people, a collective dignity- which has been contemptuously violated not only by these dictators but also, and perhaps more importantly, by their western supporters.
How is this collective dignity violated? Every time a western government approves military training, cooperation or weapons sales to a brutal dictator in full-knowledge that they can and will be used against his own people, they are participating in the violation of the collective dignity of the people of the region. Each time they apply double standards in their support for certain governments and parties and, conversely, their condemnation, or intervention on behalf of, the human rights violations of certain states while remaining silent in the face of the crimes of other, they are participating in the violation of the collective dignity of the people of the region. Each time they proclaim to support democracy in the region and then proceed to interfere in democratic processes and/or ignore the will of the people when these processes produce results that are deemed to conflict with their own interests, they are participating in the violation of the collective dignity of the people of the region.
There is one sign in particular stay with me from the Tunis protests that I think summed up the feeling of Tunisian people and the others in the region who have bravely taken to the streets these past few months to demand change and a restoration of their dignity. It read simply: GAME OVER.
This, I think, was directed not only at the repressive kleptocratic regimes that have ruled their countries for decades, but also at the international system that has enabled them to be there- most importantly, through the copious amounts of US and European diplomatic, economic and military aid over the years, in the name of:
maintaining ‘order and stability’, spreading so-called neoliberal economic reform via the IMF/WB, or ‘fighting terrorism’, or in an attempt to alleviate pressure on the West number one regional ally, Israel, so that it could continue to avoid complying with international law and violating the human rights and national aspirations of the Palestinian people.
But the people of the region have spoken. They have called the bluff of western governments that have used the fig leaf of ‘democracy promotion’ and the ‘war on terror’ to promote the narrow interests of the few, at the expense of the many.
While there are so many possible perspectives, considerations, and analyses to discuss, I will conclude by briefly commenting on the impact that these incredible developments we have witnessed in the region over the last 3 months have had on 2 key areas: their impact upon Islamist movements in the region and the way they are viewed in the West, and their impact upon the Israel-Palestine ‘peace process’. I will finish with some brief remarks on the policy direction I think Western governments, including the US and UK, should be taking in light of these events.
Political Islam
Perhaps one of the most important impacts these incredible and inspiring uprisings and revolutions we have witnessed over the past months have had is on the development of political Islam in the region, as well as the way Islamist movements are viewed and analysed by western academics, media and policy makers.
For decades the west worked side-by-side with authoritarian regimes of the region and were complicit in their use of the threat of Islamist fundamentalism to repress political opposition. One point that was raised over and over in my conversations with various civil society actors in Tunisia was how the ‘War on Terror’ was viewed as a major factor in the unwarranted arrest, torture, prosecution, and imprisonment of thousands of innocent Tunisians solely for their religious and/or political beliefs and practices over the past decade.
Not that these governments manipulated the west but that their claims of the threat of Islamist fundamentalism fit within the west’s agenda to maintain the status quo in the region- and one which proved amenable to their geo-strategic and material interests, including: security, trade, migration, oil, protection of number one ally in region-Israel- and promotion/protection of its Qualitative Military edge, etc
Though there has been consistent resistance, from secular, leftist, liberal, and Islamist movements throughout the duration of these regimes, the opposition was generally crushed- with tens of thousands imprisoned, killed and tortured. Again, in the context of the ‘war on terror’ much of this repression was excused and indeed supported by the West, that believed these brutal rulers’ common cry that the sole conceivable alternative to them is an extremist Islamist takeover.
But in the aftermath of these uprisings we have yet to see this threat materialise. Instead, when we look at what is emerging in terms of political trends amongst Islamist movements we see cooperation, rather than intransigence (e.g. October 18th agreement), moderation, rather than extremism.
As a challenge to the typical orientalist analyses that have viewed Islamist movements as unchanging and static, what we have witnessed during this period of uprisings is the fact that islamist movements can, and indeed have changed, dramatically. This is a trend that has been occurring over the last 10-15 years, and can be witnessed in the transformed discourses of Islamist movements such as Hamas and Hezbollah as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, which appeal today, much more than in the past, to universal human rights and international law.
The Islamists movements of the post-colonial period understood themselves to be facing a two-fold enemy: the militarised post-colonial state, and the neo-imperial intrusions into domestic affairs that continued even after the formal retreat of the empire.
The Islamists’ credo was Islam din wa dawla (Islam is religion and state), a version of the faith that encompassed both the conception of an independent, self-sufficient state and a comprehensive religious system that could satisfy the individual’s spiritual needs.
Today, the context in Islamist movements develop is radically different. In the political arenas of Egypt, Iran, Tunisia and Bahrain, they do not function as revolutionary, transformative programmes. There is no Khomeini at their head; no Islamist manifesto driving people’s actions. In terms of models, the people are looking towards Turkey and the AKP, rather than Khomeni/Iran, for what the leaders of En Nahda, Rachid Ghannouchi, refers to as their ‘successful synthesis of Islam and modernity’
We can certainly observe that since the late 20th century, far from being advocates of religious extremism, the Muslim Brotherhood like other Islamically-oriented candidates and political parties in Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Egypt, Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Indonesia have opted for ballots, not bullets.
Islamist activists are now entering the political scene through processes of democratisation and the fact that these movements are entering the political scene through making alliances with others, pledging to accept election results, and seeking to go beyond their constituency.
Ramifications for Palestine:
Undoubtedly, the aftershock from regional political earthquake and the shift in the balance of power it is has catalysed, has been most felt in relation to the Israeli –Palestine ‘conflict’
As gov’ts of neighbouring states start to more adequately reflect the will of the population, they will no doubt prove to be less amenable to Israeli interests- more level playing field, which should strengthen the Palestinian hand in the ‘peace process’.
Arab regimes have always sought to appease the opposition by paying lip service to the Palestinian cause, because they understand the place it holds in the Arab psyche. And while the revolutions have revealed that this tactic is no longer sufficient to keep the forces of opposition at bay, it is wrong to assume that the new Arab mood is somehow consistent with a friendlier posture towards a country that continues to occupy Palestinian land and to dispossess Palestinian people.
Most important player in this respect so far is Egypt- prominent US ally; first Arab country to sign peace deal with Israel in 1979- of course this deal was not signed by a democratic Arab government but was reached in spite of the strong opposition – that persists until today
Under Mubarak, Egypt was instrumental in maintaining three outrages from the Palestinian perspective: the blockade of the Gaza Strip, the division of the Palestinian national movement, and security collaboration between the Palestinian Authority and Israel in the West Bank.
Also, Egypt allowed Israeli bombers to overfly Egyptian territory when Israel attacked Gaza in 2008-2009
Already signs that the Egyptian government is taking steps to construct its policies in a way that more adequately reflect the will of its people:
e.g.:
Diplomatic sources inside Egypt’s Foreign Ministry have reported that the country’s Foreign Minister has sent a strongly-worded letter to Rafi Barak, the Director-General of the Israeli Foreign Ministry, warning him about the consequences of the escalation of military action against Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. Dr Nabil El-Araby pressed Barak on the necessity of maintaining the ceasefire with the Palestinians, "as any military action against Gaza will have serious repercussions on the region as a whole". El-Araby criticised Israeli policy, particularly the military’s, which threatens an attack against Gaza in a sequel to Operation Cast lead.
The Egyptian Foreign Minister has also told the Palestinians that lifting the Israeli-imposed siege of Gaza – supported by the discredited Mubarak regime – is a priority for the new government in Cairo.Unfortunately, the first reaction of the Israeli government to the events in Egypt was to adopt a bunker mentality.
Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered construction of the wall on the border with Egypt to be speeded up. Also calls for the reoccupation of the Philadelphia corridor along Egypt’s border with Gaza and Israel and the Israeli government is seeking to boost military spending and may seek an additional $20 billion in U.S. security assistance to help it manage ‘potential threats’ stemming from popular upheavals in the Arab world
Already Israel spends about 9% of its gross national product on defence, or roughly $17 billion per year. U.S. military assistance accounts for $3 billion of that.
The Israelis have reached an important juncture and now have 2 choices, either they continue down the path of intransigence and aggression, that will no doubt lead to greater insecurity for the Palestinian as well as Israeli populations and to a greater risk of regional conflagrations in the near future, or it can take advantage of this opportunity to completely change course and enter into real and comprehensive peace talks, based on respect for international law, sovereignty of its neighbours and the national aspirations of the Palestinian people. In this respect, and this brings me to my final point regarding what western states can do at this time as a means to get on the right side of history and, even, for selfish reasons, as a way to promote their own interests in the region. To begin with, they can start by delinking their own interests in the region from Israel’s and put an end to the double standards which have for far too long characterised their policies towards the two sides to the conflict. In doing so they will realise that there are plenty of other potential allies in the region who may even be able to support their economic and geo-strategic interests in the region to a greater extent than Israel could possibly to in its current and increasingly isolated and aggressive state.
They could also advantage of the opportunity to implement much-needed broader structural changes in their foreign policy towards the region, by placing real conditions on the sale of military equipment, as well as the provision of economic and military aid supplied to undemocratic and repressive regimes in the region, including Israel, Jordan, Yemen, Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, in order to help facilitate the efforts of the people of these countries to similarly regain their agency and make ‘their own history’ as the people of Tunisia and Egypt have done.
Significant cuts in aid to these states, coupled with an overall reduction in military spending and an end to western aggression in the region, would have the effect of ‘killing two birds with one stone’, as it would also promote western governments efforts to address the economic crisis and reduce gaping budget deficits in a more ethical manner than current proposals, which entail massive cuts to social spending.
Furthermore, western states could recognise how important the demand for dignity is to the people who have so bravely put their lives on the line to effect real change in their countries. This would entail a recognition of the damage that past policies have caused the people in the region- most important a recognition of the past military, economic and political support the US and European states have provided these brutal dictators and which has enabled them to stay in power for as long as they have. The most common demand I heard when talking to various civil society actors that participated in the Tunisian revolution and asking them what they thought the west could do to support their revolution was to stay away from it- the people of the region are understandably cynical and weary of western offers of support for their democratic transitions, deemed by many, too little, too late. There is enormous hope and dedication amongst the participants of these revolutions- they have uniformly expressed a desire to live in a free, independent, and democratic states– a right that decades of Western intervention has denied them. The least the west can do now is respect the people of the region in their demand for real sovereignty and equality amongst other peoples and nations of the world.
Conclusion- auspicious time for these revolutions? Will they be thwarted by western/other interests
No, for three reasons- shift in balance of power in international system, economic crisis, opening for new discourses, analyses, world view to emerge-
There is an abundance of evidence to confirm a tangible incremental shift in the balance of power in the international system, away from the US/West and towards the East (as expressed, for instance, in the US National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 2025 report).
This shift is a result of numerous factors affecting the division of power in the international system, though there is no doubt that the economic crisis, and the USA’s resulting deficit – projected to amount to nearly 11 per cent of the country’s entire economic output in 2010 – is one of the more important amongst them (Sanger 2010).
The relative decline in US global power has also been acknowledged by the conservative historian and former US military officer Andrew J. Bacevich, who attributes this development to ‘three interlocking crises’, including those involving political and cultural, military and economic factors.
According to Bacevich, ‘American power has limits and is inadequate to the ambitions to which hubris and sanctimony have given rise.’ (Bacevich 2008, 11).
Whatever the causes, this shift in structural and material power has already begun to affect US hegemony in the Middle East, as demonstrated by various strategic and military failures in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as the US’ inability to predict and/or decisively influence the direction taken by the recent revolutions and uprisings in the Middle East, including the successful overthrow of the Hosni Mubarak regime in Egypt, formerly one of the US’ closest allies in the region.
If the people of the Arab world are fortunate in achieving democratic transitions, and can begin to confront the many deep problems their societies face, it is vital that a new Arab world, born of a struggle for freedom, social justice and dignity, be treated with the respect it deserves, and that for the first time in decades it is beginning to earn.
All of which explains the rather blunt comments made in a speech at the end of February, by US Defence Secretary Robert Gates when he said "… any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so delicately put it."
Due to technical problems Dr Aly El Kabbani ‘s lecture was not recorded. He traced the history of modern Egypt until the time of the people’s revolution.
The History of modern Egypt conventionally begins in 1882, when the Khedivate of Egypt became part of the British sphere of influence in the region, a situation that conflicted with its position as an autonomous vassal state of the Ottoman Empire. The country became a British protectorate in 1914 and achieved independence in 1922.
Gamal Abdel Nasser established a one party state, known as the Republic of Egypt, following the 1952 Egyptian revolution. Egypt was ruled autocratically by three presidents over the following six decades, by Nasser from 1954 until his death in 1970, by Anwar Sadat from 1971 until his assassination 1981, and by Hosni Mubarak from 1981 until his resignation in the face of the 2011 Egyptian revolution.
As of February 2011, the country is under interim military rule.
In 1882 opposition to European control led to growing tension amongst native notables, the most dangerous opposition coming from the army. A large military demonstration in September 1881 forced the Khedive Tewfiq to dismiss his Prime Minister. In April 1882 France and Great Britain sent warships to Alexandria to bolster the Khedive amidst a turbulent climate, spreading fear of invasion throughout the country. Tawfiq moved to Alexandria for fear of his own safety as army officers led by Ahmed Urabi began to take control of the government. By June Egypt was in the hands of nationalists opposed to European domination of the country. A British naval bombardment of Alexandria had little effect on the opposition which led to the landing of a British expeditionary force at both ends of the Suez Canal in August 1882. The British succeeded in defeating the Egyptian Army at Tel El Kebir in September and took control of the country putting Tawfiq back in control. The purpose of the invasion had been to restore political stability to Egypt under a government of the Khedive and international controls which were in place to streamline Egyptian financing since 1876. It is unlikely that the British expected a long-term occupation from the outset, however Lord Cromer, Britain’s Chief Representative in Egypt at the time, viewed Egypt’s financial reforms as part of a long-term objective. Cromer took the view that political stability needed financial stability, and embarked on a programme of long term investment in Egypt’s productive resources, above all in the cotton economy, the mainstay of the country’s export earnings. In 1906 the Denshawai incident provoked a questioning of British rule in Egypt. British occupation ended nominally with the establishment of a protectorate and the installation of sultan Hussein Kamel in 1914, but British military presence in Egypt lasted until 1936,
In 1914 as a result of the declaration of war with the Ottoman Empire, of which Egypt was nominally a part, Britain declared a Protectorate over Egypt and deposed the Khedive, replacing him with a family member who was made Sultan of Egypt by the British. A group known as the Wafd Delegation attended the Paris Peace Conference of 1919 to demand Egypt’s independence. Included in the group was political leader, Saad Zaghlul, who would later become Prime Minister. When the group was arrested and deported to the island of Malta, a huge uprising occurred in Egypt.
[[Image:were mass demonstrations that became uprisings. This is known in Egypt as the First Revolution. British suppression of the anticolonial riots led to the death of some 800 people. In November 1919, the Milner Commission was sent to Egypt by the British to attempt to resolve the situation. In 1920, Lord Milner submitted his report to Lord Curzon, the British Foreign Secretary, recommending that the protectorate should be replaced by a treaty of alliance. As a result, Curzon agreed to receive an Egyptian mission headed by Zaghlul and Adli Pasha to discuss the proposals. The mission arrived in London in June 1920 and the agreement was concluded in August 1920. In February 1921, the British Parliament approved the agreement and Egypt was asked to send another mission to London with full powers to conclude a definitive treaty. Adli Pasha led this mission, which arrived in June 1921. However, the Dominion delegates at the 1921 Imperial Conference had stressed the importance of maintaining control over the Suez Canal Zone and Curzon could not persuade his Cabinet colleagues to agree to any terms that Adli Pasha was prepared to accept. The mission returned to Egypt in disgust.
In December 1921, the British authorities in Cairo imposed martial law and once again deported Zaghlul. Demonstrations again led to violence. In deference to the growing nationalism and at the suggestion of the High Commissioner, Lord Allenby, the UK [[Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian strongly opposed to British influence; King Fuad, whom the British had installed in 1922; and the British themselves, who were determined to maintain control over the Canal. Other political forces emerging in this period included the communist party (1925) and the Muslim Brotherhood (1928), which eventually became a potent political and religious force.
King Fuad died in 1936 and Farouk inherited the throne at the age of sixteen. Alarmed by Italy’s recent invasion of Ethiopia, he signed the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, requiring Britain to withdraw all troops from Egypt, except at the Suez Canal (agreed to be evacuated by 1949).
During World War II, British troops used Egypt as a base for Allied operations throughout the region. British troops were withdrawn to the Suez Canal area in 1947, but nationalist, anti-British feelings continued to grow after the war.
On 22–26 July 1952, a group of disaffected army officers (the "free officers") led by Lieutenant General Muhammad Naguib overthrew King Farouk, whom the military blamed for Egypt’s poor performance in the 1948 war with Israel. Popular expectations for immediate reforms led to the workers’ riots in Kafr Dawar on 12 August 1952, which resulted in to death sentences. Following a brief experiment with civilian rule, the Free Officers abrogated the 1953 constitution and declared Egypt a republic on 18 June 1953. Nasser evolved into a charismatic leader, not only of Egypt but of the Arab world, promoting and implementing "Arab socialism."
When the United States held up military sales in reaction to Egyptian neutrality regarding the Soviet Union, Nasser concluded an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955. When the US and the World Bank withdrew their offer to help finance the Aswan High Dam in mid-1956, Nasser nationalized the privately owned Suez Canal Company. The crisis that followed, exacerbated by growing tensions with Israel over guerrilla attacks from Gaza and Israeli reprisals, support for the FLN’s war of liberation against the French in Algeria and against Britain’s presence in the Arab world, resulted in the invasion of Egypt in October by France, Britain, and Israel.
In 1958 Egypt joined with the republic of Syria to form a state called the United Arab Republic. It existed until Syria’s secession in 1961, although Egypt continued to be known as the UAR until 1971.
Nasser helped establish with India and Yugoslavia the Non-Aligned Movement of developing countries in September 1961, and continued to be a leading force in the movement until his death.
Nasser ruled as an autocrat but remained extremely popular within Egypt and throughout the Arab world. His willingness to stand up to the Western powers and to Israel won him support throughout the region. However, Nasser’s foreign and military policies were central in provoking the Six Day War in 1967. This conflict saw the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian armed forces routed by the Israelis. Israel afterward occupied the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, Golan Heights from Syria, and West Bank and East Jerusalem from Jordan. This defeat was a severe blow to Nasser’s prestige both at home and abroad. Following the defeat, Nasser made a dramatic offer to resign, which was only retracted in the face of mass demonstrations urging him to stay. The last three years of his control over Egypt were far more subdued.
After Nasser’s death, another of the original "free officers," Vice President Anwar el-Sadat, was elected President of Egypt. In 1971, Sadat concluded a treaty of friendship with the Soviet Union but, a year later, ordered Soviet advisers to leave. Nevertheless, up to 4,000 military Soviet advisers were being shared with Syria, and Soviet engineers continued to maintain Egyptian military radar and equipment when, in 1973, Sadat launched the 6 October 1973 war with Israel.[1] Egypt’s armed forces achieved initial successes in the Crossing and advanced 15 km, reaching the depth of the range of safe coverage of its own air force. Having defeated the Israeli forces to this extent, Egyptian forces, rather than advancing under air cover, decided to immediately penetrate further into the Sinai desert. In spite of huge losses they kept advancing, creating the chance to open a gap between army forces. That gap was exploited by a tank division led by Ariel Sharon, and he and his tanks managed to penetrate onto Egyptian soil, reaching Suez City. A UN resolution supported by the United States and the Soviet Union called for an end to hostilities and for peace talks to begin. For President Anwar Sadat, however, the war was much more a victory than a draw, as the initial Egyptian successes restored Egyptian pride and led to peace talks with the Israelis that eventually led to Egypt regaining the entire Sinai peninsula.
Sadat used his immense popularity with the Egyptian people to try to push through vast economic reforms that ended the socialistic controls of Nasserism. Sadat introduced greater political freedom and a new economic policy, the most important aspect of which was the infitah or "open door". This relaxed government controls over the economy and encouraged private investment. While the reforms created a wealthy and successful upper class and a small middle class, these reforms had little effect upon the average Egyptian who began to grow dissatisfied with Sadat’s rule. In 1977, Infitah policies led to massive spontaneous riots involving hundreds of thousands of Egyptians when the state announced that it was retiring subsidies on basic foodstuffs.
Liberalization also included the reinstitution of due process and the legal banning of torture. Sadat dismantled much of the existing political machine and brought to trial a number of former government officials accused of criminal excesses during the Nasser era. Sadat tried to expand participation in the political process in the mid-1970s but later abandoned this effort. In the last years of his life, Egypt was wracked by violence arising from discontent with Sadat’s rule and sectarian tensions, and it experienced a renewed measure of repression including extra judicial arrests.
In foreign relations Sadat also launched momentous change from the Nasser era. President Sadat shifted Egypt from a policy of confrontation with Israel to one of peaceful accommodation through negotiations. Following the Sinai Disengagement Agreements of 1974 and 1975, Sadat created a fresh opening for progress by his dramatic visit to Jerusalem in November 1977. This led to the invitation from President Jimmy Carter of the United States to President Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Begin to enter trilateral negotiations at Camp David.
The outcome was the historic Camp David accords, signed by Egypt and Israel and witnessed by the US on 17 September 1978. The accords led to the 26 March 1979, signing of the Egypt–Israel Peace Treaty, by which Egypt regained control of the Sinai in May 1982. Throughout this period, US–Egyptian relations steadily improved, and Egypt became one of America’s largest recipients of foreign aid. Sadat’s willingness to break ranks by making peace with Israel earned him the enmity of most other Arab states, however. In 1977, Egypt fought a short border war with Libya.
On 6 October 1981, President Sadat was assassinated by Islamic extremists. Hosni Mubarak, Vice President since 1975 and air force commander during the October 1973 war, was elected President later that month. He was subsequently confirmed by popular referendum for three more 6-year terms, most recently in September 2005. The results of the referendums are however of questionable validity as they, with the exception of the one conducted in September 2005, listed only Mubarak as the sole candidate.
Mubarak has maintained Egypt’s commitment to the Camp David peace process, while at the same time re-establishing Egypt’s position as an Arab leader. Egypt was readmitted to the Arab League in 1989. Egypt also has played a moderating role in such international forums as the UN and the Nonaligned Movement.
Since 1991, Mubarak has undertaken an ambitious domestic economic reform program to reduce the size of the public sector and expand the role of the private sector. During the 1990s, a series of International Monetary Fund arrangements, coupled with massive external debt relief resulting from Egypt’s participation in the Gulf War coalition, helped Egypt improve its macroeconomic performance. The economy of Egypt flourished during the 1990s and 2000s. The Government of Egypt tamed inflation bringing it down from double-digit to a single digit. Gross domestic product (GDP) per capita based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) increased fourfold between 1981 and 2006, from US$ 1355 in 1981, to US$ 2525 in 1991, to US$ 3686 in 2001 and to an estimated US$ 4535 in 2006.
There has been less progress in political reform. The November 2000 People’s Assembly elections saw 34 members of the opposition win seats in the 454-seat assembly, facing a clear majority of 388 ultimately affiliated with the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP). A constitutional amendment in May 2005 changed the presidential election to a multicandidate popular vote rather than a popular validation of a candidate nominated by the People’s Assembly and on 7 September Mubarak was elected for another six-year term with 87 percent of the popular vote, followed by a distant but strong showing by Ayman Nour, leader of the opposition Ghad Party and a well-known rights activist (see Egyptian presidential election, 2005). Shortly after mounting an unprecedented presidential campaign, Nour was jailed on forgery charges critics called phony; he was released on 18 February 2009.[2] Brotherhood members were allowed to run for parliament in 2005 as independents, garnering 88 seats, or 20 percent of the People’s Assembly.
The opposition parties have been weak and divided and are not yet credible alternatives to the NDP. The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, remains an illegal organization and may not be recognized as a political party (current Egyptian law prohibits the formation of political parties based on religion). Members are known publicly and openly speak their views. Members of the Brotherhood have been elected to the People’s Assembly and local councils as independents. The Egyptian political opposition also includes groups and popular movements such as Kefaya and the April 6 Youth Movement, although they are somewhat less organized than officially registered political parties. Bloggers, or cyberactivists as Courtney C. Radsch terms them, have also played an important political opposition role, writing, organizing, and mobilizing public opposition.[3]
President Mubarak had tight, autocratic control over Egypt. A dramatic drop in support for Mubarak and his domestic economic reform program increased with surfacing news about his son Alaa being extremely corrupt and favored in government tenders and privatization. As Alaa started getting out of the picture by 2000, Mubarak’s second son Gamal started rising in the National Democratic Party and succeeded in getting a newer generation of neo-liberals into the party and eventually the government. Gamal Mubarak branched out with a few colleagues to set up Medinvest Associates Ltd., which manages a private equity fund, and to do some corporate finance consultancy work
Police brutalities are a common occurrence that are frequently employed on civilians during peaceful protests, prisoners in jail, or any unlucky citizen who a police officer does not like. Local NGOs, such as the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, estimates there have been hundreds of police brutalities daily in Cairo police stations (U.S. Department of State, 2011).
Accusations of corruption, coercion to not vote, and manipulation of the election results have been aimed at many of the elections over the past 30 years (U.S. Department of State, 2010). Until 2005, Mubarak was the only candidate to run for the presidency on a yes/no vote (Democracy Reporting International, Final Report: Assessment of the Electoral Framework in the Arab Republic of Egypt 2007). Even though Mubarak won five consecutive presidential elections with a sweeping majority of the vote, opposition groups and international election monitoring agencies have accused the elections of being rigged. According to a UN survey, voter turnout is extremely low (around 25%) because of the lack of trust in the corrupt representational system (Democracy Reporting International, 2007).
Even though the Egyptian constitution provides for the universal freedom of speech (Egypt Constitution, Article 47 – 49), the government frequently sanctions home raids, torture, arrests, and fining of bloggers and reporters who criticize the government in any way. Under the former state of emergency laws, the government can censor anything if it is considered a threat to “public safety and national security”. If any reporter or blogger violates this law by criticizing the government, they could be legally penalized with a fine of 20,000 pounds ($3,650) and up to five years in prison (U.S. Department of State, Human Rights Report: Egypt 2010). A recent violation of free speech was the Egyptian government using its power to shut down the internet and cell phone services to most of Egypt during recent protests in order to limit communication between protest groups (Robertson, The Washington Post, January 28, 2011).
2011 revolution and aftermath
Beginning on 25 January 2011, a series of street demonstrations, protests, and civil disobedience acts have taken place in Egypt, with organizers counting on the Tunisian uprising to inspire the crowds to mobilize. The demonstrations and riots were reported to have started over police brutality, state of emergency laws, unemployment, desire to raise the minimum wage, lack of housing, food inflation, corruption, lack of freedom of speech, and poor living conditions.[5] The protests’ main goal was to oust President Hosni Mubarak’s regime. On 11 February 2011, President Mubarak resigned, relinquishing power to an interim military authority
* Dr ALy El Kabbaniis a Journalist and a Political analyst on Middle East affairs. He was working from 1978 to 1981 Journalist with Al-Hwadess magazine. A weekly socio-political Pan Arab magazine. From January 1982 to June 1983 he was working with ”2000 Magazine”, a monthly futuristic magazine. From July 1983 to 1990 he was the General manager of the ”Islamic Press Agency”, publishing 5 different magazines.From 1991 to date: Free Lance Journalist and Political analyst on ME affairs in TV and Radio.
** Dr Corinna Mullin is a lecturer in Middle East Politics in the Department of Politics and International Studies (SOAS). Until last year Dr Corinna was an Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) Postdoctoral Research Fellow in the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), Department of Politics and International Studies. Originally from the United States, Ms. Mullin-Lery moved to Geneva to work for an International NGO in 2000. In 2002 she moved to London to study at the London School of Economics (LSE), Department of International Relations, where she recently completed her PhD. Ms. Mullin-Lery has taught seminars and lectured on the following topics: International Relations Theory, Politics of the Middle East, Islam and the West, Human Rights and The International Relations of the Middle East. Ms. Mullin-Lery currently lectures on the Government and Politics of the Middle East, and teaches as Masters seminar on the International Relations of the Middle East at SOAS.
